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RECENT CASES
Antitrust Law-Robinson-Patman Act-To Sat-
isfy the "In Commerce" Requirement of Section
2(a) at Least One of the Allegedly Discriminatory
Sales in a Secondary-Line Case Must Cross a
State Line
Plaintiff paving and asphalt company brought suit for dam-
ages' in federal district court, alleging that defendant supplier 2 of
crushed limestone had violated section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Price Discrimination Act 3 by charging plaintiff higher
prices for stone than it charged other customers.4 Defendant chal-
lenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction,5 arguing that since all
1. Plaintiff sought damages for allegedly discriminatory sales by defendant over a 10-
year period, 1958-1968. The district court ruled that only the period within the 4-year statute
of limitations-since August 29, 1965-was actionable. The instant court did not reach this
question because of its holding for defendant.
2. The supplier was originally known as Material Service Corporation. On December
31, 1959, General Dynamics acquired the assets of the supplier through a statutory merger,
after which the supplier operated as Material Service Division. In March 1969, it was incorpo-
rated as a wholly-owned subsidiary. Plaintiff's original complaint named only General Dy-
namics Corporation as defendant. In its answer, General Dynamics counterclaimed on behalf
of Material Service Corporation for foreclosure of a mortgage and for balances due on a
promissory note and open account. Plaintiff replied to the counterclaim, then moved for
summary judgment or dismissal of the counterclaim on the ground that Material Service
Corporation was not a party to the action. The result of this procedural dispute, a collateral
issue in the instant case, was that Material Service Corporation was held a proper party to
the suit either as a joined defendant or as a third-party defendant. Mayer Paving & Asphalt
Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 1973).
3. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), pro-
vides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers or
commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in
such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, con-
sumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit
of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . .
4. Defendant made sales of crushed limestone to both Indiana and Illinois purchasers.
Plaintiff, an Illinois customer, was charged from 20-30¢ more per ton than its Illinois competi-
tor.
5. The Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act requires the presence of each of
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of the allegedly discriminatory sales by defendant to plaintiff and
its actual competitors were strictly intrastate,' plaintiff had failed
to satisfy the Act's requirement that "either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination [must be] in commerce .
(emphasis added).7 Plaintiff contended that defendant's sales at
more favorable prices to out-of-state customers, whether actual
competitors of plaintiff or not, were sufficient to establish the "in
commerce" jurisdictional prerequisite for a Robinson-Patman Act
suit. Accepting defendant's argument, the district court granted
judgment n.o. V.8 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
these jurisdictional elements: "a discrimination must arise from (A) consummated contem-
poraneous sales transactions (B) by the same seller to different purchasers, which (C) involve
'commodities' of (D) 'like grade and quality,' and (E) occur 'in commerce'." F. ROWE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACr 45 (1962) [hereinafter cited as ROWE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION]. The dispute in this case focuses primarily on the "in commerce" require-
ment. The district court held that requirements (A) through (D) had been satisfied. Because
the Seventh Circuit held that the "in commerce" requirement had not been met in the instant
case, it had no occasion to affirm or reject the district court's conclusion regarding the other
jurisdictional elements.
6. The court noted that plaintiff had alleged neither potential nor actual competition
with defendant's purchasers in Indiana. 486 F.2d at 767 n.2a. Thus, plaintiff's only competi-
tion involving discriminatory prices occurred with other customers of defendant located
wholly within Illinois. Defendant argued, therefore, that any interstate sales it made to
Indiana customers at prices lower than those charged to plaintiff were not related to the
alleged intrastate discrimination against plaintiff and thus could not be regarded as "in
commerce" for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act.
7. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). "Com-
merce" is defined generally in the Clayton Act as interstate commerce: "trade or commerce
among the several States and with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia or
any Territory of the United States and any State, Territory, or foreign nation . . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 12 (1970). The interstate commerce requirement under different sections of the
Robinson-Patman Act, however, is not stated uniformly. Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f) and 3
apply to discriminatory practices by persons "engaged in commerce" in the "course of such
commerce." Section 2(a) requires additionally that "either or any of the purchases" be "in
commerce." Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, §§ 2(a)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(f)
(1970). See generally Kintner & Mayne, Interstate Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-
Patman Price Discrimination Act, 58 GEo. L.J. 1117, 1117-18 & nn.4-7 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Kintner & Mayne]; Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities in Commerce:
Jurisdictional Criteria Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 67 YAIE L.J. 1155, 1166 n.43 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Rowe, Discriminatory Sales]. Defendant suggested in its brief that its
sales to Indiana customers, transacted primarily at defendant's quarry in Illinois, probably
were not "in commerce" under section 2(a), but proceeded arguendo as if they were. In a
footnote to the opinion, the court stated that these "were clearly intrastate sales." 486 F.2d
at 767 n.2a. The dissent argued that the existence of defendant's sales office in LaPorte,
Indiana, and distribution yard in Gary, Indiana, controverted this dictum by the majority.
Id. at 773. Despite its dictum, the court based its holding on the assumption that the sales
to Indiana purchasers were in interstate commerce.
8. In the district court, the jury had found that defendant's sales had caused plaintiff
competitive injury and had awarded plaintiff $498,204 in damages.
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for the Seventh Circuit, held, affirmed. To satisfy the section 2(a)
"in commerce" jurisdictional requirement of the Robinson-Patman
Price Discrimination Act, a purchaser must establish that one of the
allegedly discriminatory sales to himself or his actual competitor
crossed a state line. Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dy-
namics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), review denied, 42
U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974).
Section 2 of the original Clayton Act of 19149 provided for regu-
lating unfair price discrimination' and was aimed particularly at
national trusts' practices that involved discrimination which ad-
versely affected sellers with whom the trusts were competing." This
type of discrimination, primary-line, is contrasted with secondary-
line discrimination" that occurs where defendant sells like commod-
ities at different prices to different customers, thus unfairly favoring
one customer over the other. Even though the Supreme Court subse-
quently extended the reach of section 2 to secondary-line
discriminatory pricing practices,1 3 the evolution of mass distribution
methods,' 4 which threatened the conventional manufacturer-
9. Clayton Act § 2, ch.323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1970), provides in pertinent part:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities, which commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States. . . where the effect of such discrimination may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers
of commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the com-
modity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or
transportation, or discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in
good faith to meet competition ....
10. The term "discrimination" connotes different meanings in economic, legal, and
colloquial contexts. In economic parlance it carries a neutral connotation and may evidence
healthy, desirable competition; indeed the process of competition presupposes transitory
price discriminations. See RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5, at 25-31. Legal price
discrimination, on the other hand, occurs where there is a substantial price difference. FTC
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960). See generally RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
supra note 5, at 25-35.
11. These national trusts would lower prices in selected areas, often below cost, with
the purpose of eliminating smaller, local competing sellers. See Rowe, The Evolution of the
Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1063-64 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Rowe, Evolution].
12. The distinction between primary- and secondary-line discrimination is noted in
F'C v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960). Commentators have added third-line
discrimination, suffered by a disfavored customer in his competition with customers of the
defendant supplier's favored purchaser, and fourth-line discrimination, suffered by a disfa-
vored customer in his competition with a customer of a customer of defendant supplier's
favored purchaser. See generally E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATM~A PRIMER 92-99 (1970).
13. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929).
14. Mass distributors, particularly chain stores, and mail order merchandisers inte-
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wholesaler-retailer distribution arrangement, revealed additional
inadequacies of section 2.' The Robinson-Patman Act'" was enacted
in 1936 as an amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act to correct
these weaknesses and to strengthen existing legislation. 7 The origi-
nal section 2 had prohibited discrimination by "any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce . . . ."8 This left
unanswered the question whether a seller was prohibited from dis-
criminating against a purchaser located in the same state if the
seller was also engaged in interstate business." The congressional
answer, section 2(a) of theRobinson-Patman Act, added the trouble-
some phrase "where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce . ".2.."0 Legislative history indi-
cates that, in adding this phrase, Congress intended to prohibit
price discrimination occurring intrastate as well as interstate,
"wherever it is of such a character as tends directly to burden or
affect interstate commerce." 2' Several commentators, however,
have asserted that the deletion of the clause "whether in commerce
or not" from the House version of the bill refutes such a broad
interpretation of the phrase.2 Further supporting a narrow reading
grated the retailing and wholesaling functions, permitting them to deal directly with suppliers
and thus to eliminate middleman costs. In addition, mass distributors were able, through
their centralized purchasing departments, to obtain significant discounts by purchasing large
quantities of supplies in bulk from suppliers. The result was that mass distributors received
goods from suppliers at substantially lower prices than conventional retailers could. Rowe,
Evolution, supra note 12, at 1061-63.
15. Three principal weaknesses of § 2 were: (1) the provision permitting quantity dis-
counts; (2) the provision permitting price discriminations between purchasers made in good
faith to meet competition; and (3) the provision prohibiting price discriminations only by one
"engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce." See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1936) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 2287]. For the text of § 2 of the Clayton
Act of 1914 see note 9 supra.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 13(b), 21(a) (1970). See note 3 supra for the text of § 2(a).
17. H.R. REP. No. 2287, supra note 15, at 7.
18. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
19. See Note, The Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 22 HASTINGS
L.J.-1245, 1246 (1971).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). The original "in commerce" language of § 2 was not
deleted. Thus the present "in commerce" test contains 3 requirements, of which only the
third is deemed important: (1) the discriminator must be "engaged in commerce"; (2) the
challenged discrimination must occur "in the course of such commerce"; and (3) "either or
any of the purchases involved [must be] in commerce." If the third condition is met, the
first two are necessarily fulfilled. See Rowe, Discriminatory Sales, supra note 7, at 1166-67.
21. H.R. REP. No. 2287, supra note 15, at 8.
22. See, e.g., Rowe, Discriminatory Sales, supra note 7, at 1166 n.46, citing H.R. REP.
No. 2591, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1936). In the same conference report, however, the Commit-
tee indicates why it had agreed to delete the clause, stating "[t]his was omitted, as the
preceding language [referring to the present language of section 2(a)] already. covers all
discriminations, both interstate and intrastate, that lie within the limits of Federal
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of the Robinson-Patman Act generally, and the Act's "in com-
merce" requirement particularly, is a recognition of the latent con-
flict between vigorous regulation of price discrimination and the
basic antitrust policy of encouraging competition. Competition
feeds on transitory price discrimination, and to the extent that en-
forcement of the Robinson-Patman Act imposes uniformity of
prices, it necessarily stifles competition.2 3 Recognizing this
conflict,2 1 the Supreme Court imposed a duty on the courts and the
Federal Trade Commission to reconcile Robinson-Patman Act in-
terpretations with the broader policies of the antitrust laws.25 Courts
that have adjudicated the reach of the interstate commerce provi-
sion of section 2(a) in cases involving intrastate discrimination by
a seller also engaged in interstate activity have not been notably
influenced by the opposition of these above mentioned forces.2 1
In the leading case interpreting the scope of the "in commerce"
jurisdictional requirement of section 2(a), Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co. ,27 the Supreme Court did, however, rely on the legislative
history of the Robinson-Patman Act. In that case the Court held
that section 2(a) prohibited strictly intrastate price discrimination
when defendant seller utilized profits derived from interstate sales
to subsidize local, discriminatory price cuts, even though plaintiff
seller had not competed with defendant for the out-of-state custom-
ers.28 Subsequent primary-line decisions by federal courts of ap-
authority." Id. at 6 (emphasis added). Another writer contends that Congress deleted the
clause because of its belief that the language was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), which was
handed down only 2 weeks before Representative Patman introduced the original bill. See
Note, supra note 19, at 1256.
23. See note 10 supra. See generally RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5, at 24-
35.
24. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this potential clash between the Robinson-
Patman Act and general antitrust policy, first in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-
49 (1951), and again in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953).
25. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953). A corollary to this duty of
reconciling Robinson-Patman interpretations with antitrust policy is that section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act is intended to protect competition, not individual competitors. Pres-
umbably, if competition is protected, the process will sustain efficient competitors and weed
out the inefficient, ultimately serving the best interest of the consuming public. See generally
ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5, at 126-32.
26. See RoWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5, at 131. See also note 25 supra.
27. 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
28. Plaintiff in Moore operated an intrastate bakery in New Mexico. Defendant, a
corporation in New Mexico, unfairly undercut prices in New Mexico, but also made sales to
customers in Texas. Furthermore, defendant was one of several corporations, some of which
were located in Texas, that used the same name and a common advertising program and that
were linked by interlocking ownership and management. The Court noted that defendant
subsidized local pricecuts in New Mexico with profits both from its own sales across the state
19741
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peals, rarely mentioning the legislative history or general antitrust
policy, have noted that one of defendant's discriminatory sales in
Moore in fact crossed a state line. The decisions accordingly have
treated Moore's expansive interpretation of the interstate commerce
provision largely as dictum and have required that at least one of
the challenged discriminatory sales cross a state line. In Food Bas-
ket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc. ,29 the Tenth Circuit refused jurisdiction
under section 2(a) because none of the allegedly discriminatory sales
crossed a state line, despite plaintiffs argument that defendant
used interstate profits to underwrite the local price cuts. The court
held that the use of profits derived from sales transactions con-
ducted solely in another state by another store in defendant
corporation's chain constituted an insufficient interstate nexus with
the challenged intrastate price discrimination. In a recent decision
on rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed its earlier decision
in Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co.30 on grounds similar to those in Food
Basket. In Littlejohn, plaintiff alleged only that defendant under-
wrote intrastate discrimination with interstate profits. The majority
held that in order to satisfy the section 2(a) jurisdictional require-
ment plaintiff must also demonstrate that at least one discrimina-
tory transaction crossed a state line. Another restrictive dimension
to the "in commerce" requirement was added by the Sixth Circuit
in Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Products Corp.31 In that
case, the court held that since defendant plant, an independent
subsidiary of an interstate corporation, made its own sales only in
Ohio, the "in commerce" requirement had not been met, even
though a related Ohio subsidiary plant of the corporation sold like
commodities in interstate commerce. Justice Black, dissenting in
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the case, argued that
even though the local plant sold strictly intrastate, it, like the other
subsidiaries, drew on the economic power of the national opera-
tion-a factor that he contended should be sufficient to bring the
local price discrimination within the purview of section 2(a) 2 The
lines to Texas customers and from sales by its related corporations in other states. In support
of its decision, the Court referred to a statement by Congressman Utterback, manager of the
Robinson-Patman bill in the House, that interstate commerce may not be used by a seller to
burden local trade any more than local commerce may be used to injure interstate trade. 348
U.S. at 116-20.
29. 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967).
30. 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 849 (1973), rev'g 456 F.2d
225 (5th Cir. 1972). For comments on the earlier case see 26 VAND. L. REV. 146 (1973) and 86
HARV. L. Rav. 765 (1973).
31. 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962).
32. 373 U.S. 934, 935-36 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 309 F.2d 943 (6th
[Vol. 27
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Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its Willard decision when faced with very
similar facts in Cream Crest-Blanding Dairies v. National Dairy
Products Corp.33 In its petition for Supreme Court review, the
Cream Crest plaintiff argued that the Sixth Circuit in Willard had
misread Moore as turning on an interstate sale for its conclusion
that defendant was in commerce, rather than on the interlocking
ownership and management of affiliated corporations.34 The Su-
preme Court again denied certiorari.3 5 In Borden Co. v. FTC,3 one
of the few secondary-line cases addressing the scope of the interstate
commerce jurisdictional requirement under section 2(a), plaintiff
purchaser alleged that defendant seller, the local subsidiary of an
interstate corporation, was favoring other intrastate purchasers with
lower prices. Reversing the trial examiner, the FTC granted juris-
diction.37 The Commission, in a transparent attempt to expand the
scope of section 2(a), reasoned that since Borden was an interstate
company all of its products must be in commerce, and therefore
concluded that the interstate commerce requirement was satisfied.
The Seventh Circuit reversed,3 8 citing Willard and noting that the
challenged local plant produced, processed, and sold its products
wholly within the state. Despite the seemingly favorable legislative
history, until recently only the flow of commerce doctrine39-
inapplicable to the factual situation of the instant case-has made
any advance against this citadel of restrictive readings of the "in
commerce" provision of section 2(a).
In the instant case, the Seventh Circuit characterized the juris-
Cir. 1962).
33. 370 F.2d 332 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967). The only notable factual
difference from Willard was that defendant plant in Cream Crest-Blanding was ultimately
controlled by corporate officers outside the state.
34. See Kintner & Mayne, supra note 7, at 1122 & n.30.
35. 387 U.S. 930 (1967).
36. 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964).
37. Borden Co. v. FTC, [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,776, at
21,717 (FTC 1964).
38. 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964).
39. The flow of commerce doctrine developed during a period of judicial expansion of
the reach of the Sherman Act. Under this doctrine, the commerce power of the Constitution
may reach parties who come into contact with goods that are moving in interstate commerce.
The point at which such goods "come to rest" is the extremity beyond which the commerce
power cannot reach. Substantial alteration of the goods and temporary storage of the goods
for too great a period of time are 2 of the situations in which courts have found that the goods
have lost their interstate character. The doctrine was first found applicable under the
Robinson-Patman Act in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). The Court distin-
guished the facts of the instant case from those in flow of commerce cases under § 2(a). 486
F.2d at 769. For a discussion of the applicability of the doctrine under section 2(a) see Note,
supra note 19, at 1262-66. See also Kintner & Mayne, supra note 7, at 1130-33.
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dictional issue under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Price
Discrimination Act as a question of statutory interpretation and
declined to examine the constitutional reach of the statute." The
court looked initially to Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.4' and
Borden Co. v. FTC42 for controlling principles. Differentiating
between primary-line and secondary-line price discrimination, the
court distinguished the instant, secondary-line case from Moore, a
primary-line case, on two grounds. First, since defendant in the
instant case was neither cutting prices charged to intrastate com-
petitors of the plaintiff nor subsidizing those price cuts with profits
derived from interstate sales at higher prices, the court asserted that
the impermissible "underwriting" practice found in Moore was not
present here. Secondly, the court noted the absence in the instant
case of the interlocking management and pattern for monopolistic
growth that it deemed a decisive factor in Moore. Finding Borden,
a secondary-line case, more analogous, the court observed that even
though defendant seller in that case was engaged in interstate activ-
ity, as in the instant case, the Borden court had refused jurisdiction
under section 2(a). The court acknowledged, however, the factual
distinction that, unlike plaintiff in the instant case, plaintiff in
Borden had failed to establish that any of defendant's sales had
been made interstate. Recognizing the instant dispute, therefore, to
be one of first impression falling between Moore and Borden, the
court turned to the specific language of section 2(a) :1 "where either
or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce ... " (emphasis added). Construing the word "involved" in
light of the purpose of antitrust laws to protect competition, and
fortified by later references in section 2(a) to "competition,"" the
court concluded that only those purchases by plaintiff or its actual
competitors could be considered in determining whether "either or
any" discriminatory sale was "in commerce."45 Implicitly adopting
40. The court noted that the "in commerce" requirement of the Sherman Act has been
read much more broadly by the courts than the same requirement under the Robinson-
Patman Price Discrimination Act. 486 F.2d at 767.
41. 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
42. 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964).
43. Citing a statement made in a case comment, 86 HARV. L. REv. 765, 769 (1973), that
congressional intent in § 2(a) is unusually difficult to decipher from the legislative history,
the court declined to discuss the legislative history. 486 F.2d at 767.
44. The word "competition" appears twice in § 2(a). Where the effect of price discrimi-
nation "may be substantially to lessen competition or . . . to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition" (emphasis added) it is unlawful. For the pertinent text of § 2(a) see note 3
supra.
45. The court characterized the "in commerce" jurisdictional requirement as an ana-
[Vol. 27
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the traditional state-line test of the scope of the section 2(a) "in
commerce" requirement, the court suggested in dictum that an
interstate sale, even though not to a competitor, might satisfy the
jurisdictional prerequisite in a primary-line case when used to un-
derwrite intrastate price cuts. The court held, however, that in a
secondary-line case, one of the discriminatory sales must not only
cross a state line, but must also be to an actual competitor of the
disfavored purchaser.
In a forceful dissent, Mr. Justice Clark" asserted that the re-
cord demonstrated that plaintiff had indeed attempted to compete
with defendant's Indiana customers, but had been precluded from
successful competition by defendant's discriminatory pricing. 8
Given this fact, he reasoned, the majority opinion implicitly sub-
jected plaintiff to a vicious circle; it permitted defendant to charge
discriminatory prices with the effect of precluding plaintiff from
interstate competition and then denied plaintiff the protection of
section 2(a) because he was not a competitor with the interstate
customer. Such a reading, he noted, subverted the protective pur-
pose of section 2(a). Mr. Justice Clark then concluded that the
jurisdictional requirement of section 2(a) was satisfied when plain-
tiff established that a discriminatory sale was made across a state
line; proof of actual or potential competition becomes crucial, he
stated, only as to the question of damages.
Since the instant court announces that this is a case of first
impression, it is important to delineate carefully the court's holding.
The court held only that section 2(a) does not reach discriminatory
intrastate sales to competing purchasers where the seller also makes
an interstate sale at favorable prices to a purchaser with whom the
disfavored intrastate purchaser is not competing. The majority did
not meet the issue of potential competition raised by the dissent,
ostensibly because plaintiff did not allege it." If plaintiff in fact
attempted to compete with defendant's Indiana purchasers and was
prevented from so doing by defendant's discriminatory pricing, then
the dissent's argument would seem compelling." To argue that a
purchaser totally cut off from interstate competition by a seller's
logue to standing and then stated that "[tihe customer has standing only to raise and
compare those sales which are injurious to his competition." 486 F.2d at 770.
46. 486 F.2d at 770.
47. Mr. Justice Clark, formerly of the United States Supreme Court, sitting by designa-
tion.
48. But see note 6 supra.
49. Id.
50. See text accompanying notes 47 and 48 supra.
1974l
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discriminatory prices may not invoke the protection of section 2(a)
because he is not a "competitor" would contravene the recognized
antitrust policy of promoting fair competition. Indeed, preclusion
from competition by price discrimination arguably results in a
greater degree of injury to the disfavored purchaser than would the
clearly prohibited "lessening" of existing competition by discrimi-
natory practices.- Assuming, however, that this issue properly was
not decided by the majority, the instant holding on its face comports
with recent primary-line cases, which have held that one of the
discriminatory sales must cross a state line before jurisdiction under
section 2(a) may be invoked.52 Furthermore, a literal reading of the
language of section 2(a) seems to require, as the majority held, that
only those sales actually involved in the discrimination may be
considered in the threshold jurisdictional determination of whether
such sales were "in commerce." As previsouly noted, however, the
legislative history indicates the congressional intent that section
2(a) reach to the extent of federal authority to legislate under the
commerce power.53
Several commentators, pointing to the courts' treatment of the
analogous Sherman Act commerce requirement, have argued that
a judicial broadening of the commerce requirement of section 2(a)
is appropriate." Although the instant court consciously sidestepped
this opportunity,5 the Ninth Circuit recently seized it in Copp Pav-
ing Co. v. Gulf Oil Co.56 In that case, defendant allegedly discrimi-
nated against plaintiff in strictly intrastate sales of asphalt used for
building interstate highways. The court recognized that the statu-
51. "It shall be unlawful . . . to discriminate in price . . . where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition . . . or prevent
competition ... " Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) (emphasis
added).
52. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
94 S. Ct. 849 (1973); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1967).
Although these decisions apparently restrict the Supreme Court's broad holding in Moore,
some commentators have suggested that the Court's denial of certiorari in Cream Crest-
Blanding Dairies v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 370 F.2d 332 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 930 (1967), and in Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963), amounts to a ratification of the narrower readings
in these subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Kintner & Mayne, supra note 7, at 1133.
53. See notes 21 and 22 supra and accompanying text.
if
54. Id. See also Note, The Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 22
HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (1971). For an interesting counterargument see 86 HARv. L. Rav. 765, 771-
72 (1973).
55. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
56. No. 72-2152 (9th Cir., Oct. 3, 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3424 (No.
73-1012). This decision was handed down only 2 days after the instant decision.
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tory language of the Robinson-Patman Act and Clayton Act is not
so broad and flexible as that of the Sherman Act, but it nevertheless
asserted that since those two Acts were intended to supplement the
purpose and effect of the Sherman Act, the "in commerce" require-
ments of all three Acts should be interpreted uniformly. Rejecting
the defendant's contention that section 2(a) requires a sale across
state lines in all cases, the Copp court held that when the intrastate
sale of a commodity (such as asphalt used in the construction of
interstate highways) is closely linked to an "instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce," the "nexus" of the sale with the instrumental-
ity satisfies the "in commerce" requirement. Given the requisite
"nexus," the court reasoned, the sale need not also satisfy a state-
line test of "in commerce." Copp Paving's significance lies in its
explicit expansion of the scope of the interstate commerce require-
ment of section 2(a). Nevertheless, its holding is limited to intra-
state sales of commodities that are closely linked with an instru-
mentality of interstate commerce; it thus may be characterized as
but another method, like the flow of commerce doctrine, for circum-
venting the inflexible state-line test in special factual situations. Al-
though it cursorily dismisses the legislative history of section 2(a)
as undecipherable" and consciously sidesteps the issue of constitu-
tional authority to legislate under the commerce power, the instant
decision is technically acceptable, and its reasoning is in the main-
stream of judicial construction of section 2(a). It may, however,
restrict the scope of the "in commerce" jurisdictional requirement
in secondary-line cases to an even greater extent than in the recent
primary-line decisions that have narrowed the Moore holding.
Although Moore and subsequent primary-line decisions have consis-
tently required that at least one of defendant seller's sales cross a
state line,5s this interstate sale may be to a purchaser for whose
business plaintiff is not even competing. The jurisdictional require-
ment under section 2(a) is satisfied by any interstate sale in
primary-line cases; if the interstate nexus does not result from the
interstate sale's direct involvement in the discrimination, it gener-
ally will be found in the use of profits from the interstate sale to
underwrite the intrastate discrimination. 9 Secondary-line price dis-
.57. See note 43 supra.
58. See cases cited note 52 supra.
59. Indeed, the courts seem to require little proof that such profits actually were used
to underwrite the discriminatory price-cuts. Rather, since the discrimination is effected by
the offending seller's lowering his prices below those of his competitor, and even occasionally
below the cost of the product being sold, the courts apparently presume that such interstate
profits are used to subsidize the discrimination.
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crimination, however, results not from undercutting a competing
seller's prices, but from charging a disfavored purchaser higher
prices than those charged his competitors. The underwriting theory
presumably is not available to provide the interstate nexus between
the intrastate price discrimination and an otherwise unrelated in-
terstate sale by defendant seller, because, as the instant court -im-
plies, there will be no need to underwrite discriminatory price hikes.
Thus, whereas section 2(a) may regulate intrastate price discrimi-
nation in primary-line cases by defendant sellers who also make
sales that cross state lines, the instant decision results in denying
section 2(a) protection against intrastate price discrimination in
secondary-line cases, even though defendant seller also makes a sale
across a state line. This result does not seem warranted in light of
Congress' apparent intent to prohibit price discrimination occurring
intrastate as well as interstate whenever it affects interstate com-
merce." The instant decision seemingly would allow a large inter-
state business to immunize itself from the sanctions of section 2(a)
merely by taking care that its discriminatory sales to favored and
disfavored competing purchasers both occur within one state. The
decision similarly implies that a disfavored purchaser who does not
compete interstate would be deprived of the Act's protection when
the favored purchaser was in interstate operation, so long as all
purchases by both were within the state. The instant court did not
base its decision on the argument that the potential conflict in
policies of price regulation and antitrust law"' justifies restraint in
the regulation of price discrimination. This argument, however,
would provide little support for the instant decision. Restraint in the
regulation of price discrimination is aimed toward preventing price
uniformity, not toward preventing price discrimination. To the ex-
tent that a seller's pricing practices result in unlawful discrimina-
tion, a seller involved in interstate commerce should not be able to
avoid the sanctions of section 2(a) through unjustifiably technical
jurisdictional requirements.
60. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.




Exclusion of Pregnancy-Related Disabilities from
State Salary Compensation Insurance Program
Denies Equal Protection to Pregnant Employees
Plaintiffs, female employees, were denied salary compensation
insurance for pregnancy-related work losses' solely on the basis of
section 2626 of the California Unemployment Insurance Code,'
which exempts such losses from the coverage of the state disability
insurance program for a period of twenty-eight days after termina-
tion of pregnancy. Maintaining that section 2626 constitutes a de-
nial of equal protection of the laws contrary to the fourteenth
amendment, 3 plaintiffs initiated a class action to recover compensa-
tion.' They asserted first that sex is a suspect category and the
statute is unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny standard. Alter-
natively, they argued that the court should adopt a new intermedi-
ate test stricter than the traditional rational basis standard for de-
termining the constitutionality of discrimination based upon sex.5
Defendant, California Department of Human Resources, contended
that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities is necessary pri-
marily to protect the financial solvency of the mandatory insurance
program,' which is funded entirely by employee contributions spe-
cifically limited by statute to one percent of wages.7 The defendant
1. The five named plaintiffs' disability claims were based upon an ectopic pregnancy,
a tubal pregnancy, one miscarriage and two claims alleging general physical incapacitation.
2. "'Disability' or 'disabled' includes both mental or physical illness and mental or
physical injury. An individual shall be deemed disabled in any day in which, because of his
physical or mental condition, he is unable to perform his regular or customary work. In no
case shall the term 'disability' or 'disabled' include any injury or illness caused by or arising
in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28
days thereafter." CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 2626 (West 1972).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In pertinent part § 1 reads: "No State shall. . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
4. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other women similarly situated, asked the
court to enjoin the State Department of Human Resources Development from denying bene-
fits on the basis of § 2626 and to require the Department to consider plaintiffs' claims as if
§ 2626 did not exist.
Eligible employees receive benefits varying between $25 and $105 per week depending
upon the amount earned during a base period for a maximum of 26 weeks. CAL. UNEP. INS.
CODE §§ 2653, 2655 (West 1972).
5. 359 F. Supp. 792, 796 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
6. Defendant argues that pregnancy-related disabilities are unique in that coverage is
so extraordinarily expensive that it would be impossible to maintain a program supported
by employee contributions if these disabilities are included. The court admitted that the
postulated cost increase would require an approximately 37% increase in annual premiums
and would result in raising the maximum annual contribution from $85 to $119.
7. Employees must contribute 1% of their salaries up to a maximum of $85 per year.
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also alleged that the exclusion eliminates the administrative diffi-
culty of determining when a pregnancy-related disability begins; 8
prevents abuse of the program by noncareer oriented women;9 and
ensures that women will not receive a disporportionate share of the
benefits of the program.'0 A three judge federal court" for the North-
ern District of California held, judgment for plaintiffs. Section 2626
of the California Unemployment Insurance Code, which excludes
pregnancy-related disabilities from salary compensation insurance
coverage, is not based upon a classification having a rational and
substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose and therefore
deprives pregnant employees of equal protection of the law. Aiello
v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973), review granted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1973).
The California Unemployment Insurance Code establishes a
comprehensive legislative scheme designed to provide protection
against wage losses caused by involuntary unemployment.'2 The
disability insurance program provides cash benefits to persons inca-
pacitated as a result of nonjob-related illnesses and injuries with the
sole exceptions of institutionalized psychopaths' 3 and pregnant
women.'4 In 1958, the California Supreme Court in Clark v. Califor-
nia Employment Stabilization Commission5 rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge to section 2626, finding that under the traditional
rational basis test the statute did not discriminate unconstitu-
tionally against pregnant employees.' 6 Under a stricter equal protec-
To be eligible to receive benefits, an employee must have contributed 1% of a minimum
income of $300 during a one year base period. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE §§ 984, 985, 2901, 2652
(West 1972).
8. 359 F. Supp. at 800.
9. Id. The court noted that whereas women contribute 28% of the total disability insur-
ance fund, they receive 38% of the funds in benefits.
10. Id.
11. The 3-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), which re-
quires a 3-member court when the injunction of a state statute is involved.
12. The disability insurance program provides benefits to persons unable to work be-
cause of almost any nonjob-related disability. A complementary program provides compensa-
tion to unemployed persons able to and available for work. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE §§ 100, 2601
(West 1972). Job-related disabilities are dealt with under workmen's compensation. CAL.
LABOR CODE § 3201 (West 1971).
13. Institutionalized dipsomaniacs, drug addicts, and sexual psychopaths are disquali-
fied from receiving benefits while confined. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 2678 (West 1972).
14. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 2626 (West 1972).
15. 166 Cal. App. 2d 326, 332 P.2d 716 (1958).
16. The "rational basis" test used in Clark presumes the constitutionality of the chal-
lenged statute and requires that the classification drawn by the statute bear some rational
relation to a legitimate state goal. Classifications, however, will only be set aside if no grounds
can be conceived to justify them. See Dandridge. v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970);
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
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tion standard certain classifications are presumed unconstitutional
and are subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, which a statute can
survive only if it forwards a "compelling state interest."' To qualify
for this "strict scrutiny" standard the challenged classification must
be based upon a "suspect" criterion such as race,' 8 or infringe upon
a "fundamental right" such as the right to vote." Confronted with
a choice of standards, scholars and justices have realized that nei-
ther test allows equal protection cases to be tried upon their facts
nor eliminates judicial subjectivity. Because neither test affords
leeway for the balancing of the opposing interests, the court in effect
predetermines the outcome by deciding which test to apply."0 While
not overruling past precedent based on strict scrutiny, the Burger
Court, cognizant of these handicaps suffered under the "two-
tiered"' 2' system, has been disinclined to expand the list of funda-
mental rights and suspect categories.2 2 Instead, an intermediate
third standard, "substantial rationality" 23 or "newer equal protec-
tion, 21 emerged in a series of equal protection cases beginning in
1971.21 Unlike the traditional passive rational basis standard, the
newer "substantial rationality" requires that a discriminating stat-
ute must substantially forward an actual legislative purpose.2 1 Al-
though it has not expressly enunciated this test,27 the Court has
17. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In its entire history only one statute
has withstood the withering gaze of "strict scrutiny." Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
See Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA.
L. REV. 1489, 1495 (1972). [hereinafter cited as 58 VA.]
18. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
19. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). For an excellent in-depth analysis
of traditional rational basis and strict scrutiny see Note, Developments in the Law: Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
20. See Note, Equal Protection and the Pregnancy Leave Cases, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 628,
644 (1973); 58 VA., supra note 17, at 1495.
21. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972) [hereinafter cited as 86 HARVARD].
22. See Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S. Jan. 21,
1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); 86 HARVARD, supra note 21, at 12.
23. Note, supra note 20.
24. Id. at 641.
25. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Mayer
v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). But see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
Schilb v. Keubel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) in which
the Court apparently relied upon the traditional rational basis test.
26. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
27. While the instant case marks the first time a majority of any court has openly
admitted altering traditional rational basis, such action has been acknowledged by concur-
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been less willing to supply justifying rationales, demanding proof of
actual legislative purposes and not mere conjecture from the propo-
nents of the questioned statute. 2 Furthermore, the reasonableness
of the statute is judged upon verifiable evidence rather than judicial
hypothesis. 2 The Supreme Court first applied the new standard in
the 1971 decision of Reed v. Reed,"0 inpalidating an Idaho probate
code provision preferring males to females as administrators. Al-
though the majority claimed to apply the traditional rational basis
test it did find that the classification served the legitimate purpose
of reducing the work loads of the probate courts. 1 This was the first
classification based upon sex to be held unconstitutional.2 The
Court's refusal, however, to enunciate clearly the proper equal pro-
tection standard to use in sex discrimination cases introduced a
welter of confusion in the lower courts. In a 1973 decision, Green v.
Waterford Board of Education,3 3 the Second Circuit became the first
federal court to expressly acknowledge the use of the new substan-
tial rationality test and operating thereunder overturned a forced
maternity-leave statute. The Fourth Circuit, however, employing
the traditional rational basis standard, upheld a similar maternity-
leave statute in Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board34-a
dichotomy resulting primarily from uncertainty as to which stan-
dard to apply. 5 Subsequently, the situation was clouded further by
Frontiero v. Richardson3 in which eight Justices struck down a
ring Supreme Court Justices. Vlandis v. Kline, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2238 (1973) (White, J., concur-
ring).
28. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1971); 86 HARVARD, supra note 21, at 19.
29. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1971); 86 HARVARD, supra note 21, at 19.
30. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The court stated that: "[a] classification 'must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation .... '" [emphasis added]. Id. at 76 citing Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
31. The court held that sex based discrimination implemented only to forward adminis-
trative expedience is the kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the equal protection
clause. 404 U.S. at 76.
32. See Note, Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause and Women's Rights,
19 LOYOLA L. REV. 542, 547 (1973).
33. 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
34. 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1925 (1973).
35. See 1972 Wisc. L. REv. 626.
36. 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973). In addition to constitutional questioning, sex discrimination
has also been attacked via Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
Title VII makes sex-based discrimination with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment" an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1970). As interpreted by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations, Title VII
forbids employers to exclude pregnancy-related disabilities from applicable insurance cover-
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provision under a federal statute disallowing dependents' allow-
ances to female members of the armed forces who failed to prove the
economic dependence of the male spouse. Four Justices declared sex
a suspect classification, 3 and three others concurred on the basis of
Reed.38
The instant court initially observed that a majority in Frontiero
did not label sex as a suspect classification. Relying upon Green,39
the court applied a "slightly, but perceptibly, more rigorous" ra-
tional basis test 0 that requires that classifications be fairly and
substantially related to the object of the legislation. Pointing out
that the only expressed purpose of the insurance program is to re-
duce disability-related economic suffering to a minimum,4' the
court reasoned that this was not a legitimate purpose for the chal-
lenged exclusion since the economic hardship on pregnant women
is identical to that of other disabled workers. Turning to the unex-
pressed purposes that were claimed to have been promoted by the
exclusion, the court examined defendant's main contention that the
prodigious expense of insuring pregnancy-related disabilities would
render the employee-financed program insolvent. The court ac-
knowledged the propriety of preserving a program's fiscal integrity,
but required that the instant exclusion be shown to rest on some
distinction fairly and substantially related to the object of the stat-
ute. It decided, therefore, that pregnancy-related disabilities cannot
be excluded merely to reduce costs, and concluded that if a state
wishes to save expenses by limiting large claims it must do so by
limiting all claims in excess of certain amounts regardless of the
nature of the disability.2 Evaluating proferred secondary purposes
for the exclusion, the court recognized that women contributed
age. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1973). It should be noted, however, that this regulation applies
only to insurers that are also employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies. Id.
at § 1604.1(a). It does not apply to insurers who are not also employers of the insured workers.
37. 93 S. Ct. at 1768.
38. Id. at 1773.
39. 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
40. 359 F. Supp. at 796 citing Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 633 (2d
Cir. 1973).
41. CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 2601 (West 1972).
42. 359 F. Supp. at 799. The court pointed out that the entire expense of the proposed
addition could be met by increasing the maximum contribution level and premiums approxi-
mately 40%. The court further determined that all pregnancy-related disabilities cannot be
constitutionally excluded because of the expense of providing coverage for the entire group.
The belief that all pregnant women are incapable of work for extended periods resulting in
large claims was debunked by the court as a stereotypical generalization rejected in analogous
maternity leave cases. See Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir.),
vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
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twenty-eight percent of total premiums and received thirty-eight
percent of the benefits. Nevertheless, the majority found that in the
absence of an overall attempt to distribute benefits based upon a
claimant's percentage of contribution,43 such actuarial concepts
could not be utilized to limit the compensation of a class simply
because it would result in women receiving a disproportionate share
of benefits." The contention that the exclusion prevents abuse of the
program by noncareer oriented women who voluntarily become
pregnant and collect a substantial award with no intention of re-
turning to work was likewise rejected as irrational and arbitrary.
The court emphasized that while many pregnancy-related disabili-
ties are not voluntarily incurred, 5 every other voluntarily incurred
disability is covered.46 Finally, the court discredited the assertion
that section 2626 is necessary to avoid the difficulty of determining
when a pregnant woman is truly disabled. The majority stated that
a disability is no more easily diagnosed twenty-eight days after
pregnancy than before.47 Having found that the statute was not
based upon a classification having a rationale and substantial rela-
tionship to a legitimate state purpose, the court concluded that the
exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities is unconstitutonal. In a
dissenting opinion Judge Williams argued that the disability pro-
gram had been envisioned as an insurance program with the objec-
tive of providing the broadest coverage and maximum benefits pos-
sible within the limits of a one percent contribution rate. He con-
cluded that a desire to provide the broadest coverage possible to the
entire working population, coupled with a limited contribution rate
lends rationality to the challenged exclusion.
Subsequent to the instant decision, the repercussions of
Frontiero were manifested in Hanson v. Hutt49 when the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held sex to be a suspect classification and struck
down a state employment compensation law that disqualified speci-
fied pregnant women from benefits." Nevertheless, the Supreme
43. It should be noted, however, that the majority did not say that the presence of an
attempt to distribute benefits based upon a claimant's percentage of contribution necessarily
would lend constitutionality to the challenged exclusion. 359 F. Supp. at 800.
44. Id.
45. The court emphasized that three of plaintiffs' disabilities resulted from an ectopic
pregnancy, tubal pregnancy, and miscarriage-none voluntarily incurred. Id.
46. The statute even covers cosmetic plastic surgery. Id.
47. Id. at 801.
48. Id. at 803-04, 806.
49. 42 U.S.L.W. 2372 (Dec. 20, 1973).
50. The statute disqualified pregnant women from benefits during the period between




Court, in an apparent retreat from its holding in Frontiero demon-
strated its reluctance to designate sex definitively as a suspect cate-
gory in Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur,5 finding that a
mandatory school teacher maternity leave statute violated due pro-
cess."2 While three justices maintained that the equal protection
clause should have been implemented, 5 no member of the Court
alluded to sex as a suspect classification. Therefore, the uncertainty
as to the equal-protection standard to apply to challenged sex-based
classifications after La Fleur is substantially the same as it was at
the time of the instant decision.
The instant decision not only helps alleviate confusion as to the
proper test to apply in sex discrimination cases, but also formally
endorses a much needed alteration of the two-tiered equal-
protection standard. The new substantial rationality, neither lim-
ited by decisions based upon judicial conjecture, as is old rational
basis, nor cursed with the predisposed inflexibility of strict scru-
tiny,"4 should prove to be a viable compromise in sex discrimination
litigation.5 Whereas some commentators feel that reasonable scru-
tiny will be limited to sex discrimination cases,5" the instant court
correctly indicated that the Supreme Court intended the new stan-
dard to embrace the entire spectrum of equal protection not pres-
ently subject to the strict scrutiny test.57 The new "reasonableness"
51. - U.S.-, 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974). The Sixth Circuit, employing
the substantial rationality standard, had declared the questioned mandatory leave statute
to be violative of equal protection. 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1973).
52. - U.S. at - , 42 U.S.L.W. at 4191.
53. Justice Powell, concurring, and Justice Rehnquist, with whom the Chief Justice
joined in dissent, maintained that equal protection was the proper standard to apply. Id. at
4192, 4194.
54. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
55. Under the new standard a challenged classification will survive only if it is reasona-
ble, not arbitrary, and substantially forwards a legitimate state purpose. No longer may the
reasonableness of a statute and the propriety of its purpose be grounded upon judicial hypoth-
esis and conjecture. The new test, to the contrary, demands that defendant establish a
legitimate need for the challenged classification with proof based upon verifiable evidence
and statistics or fail. See 86 HARVARD, supra note 21, at 21. Furthermore, the more equitable
results of substantial rationality attenuate the possibility that classifications will be invalida-
ted without a hearing on the merits-the result of the strict scrutiny test. This is particularly
significant since an in-depth judicial investigation is needed whenever sex is involved-for
even the instant plaintiffs admitted that some sex-based classifications are permissible. 359
F. Supp. at 802.
56. See, e.g., Krauskopf, Sex Discrimination-Another Shibboleth Legally Shattered,
37 Mo. L. REV. 377, 387 (1972).
57. The Court has utilized the new standard in equal protection suits far removed from
questions of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)
(ordinance forbidding all picketing and demonstrating, except by labor unions, within 150
feet of a school in session held to be unconstitutional).
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does not require unanimity of thought, but only substantial ration-
ality based upon facts. The Supreme Court recently commented:
"The very complexity of. . . [social and economic] problems sug-
gests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible
method of solving them." 8 Therefore, to operate as a viable altera-
tion of the inflexible "two-tiered" approach, applicatioi of the new
standard must be based not upon a substitution of judicial wisdom,
but upon an objective evaluation of facts. Despite the instant
court's express adoption of the new standard, apparently it did not
consistently apply the required objectivity to the instant issue. For
instance, the majority summarily dismissed the contention that the
exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities prevents abuse of the
program by pregnant employees who receive benefits with no inten-
tion of returning to work. Surveys indicate, however, that while
approximately one hundred percent of those who recover from short
term disabilities continue their employment, forty to fifty percent
of female employees who give birth do not return to work. 9 The
inclusion of all pregnancy-related disabilities, as demanded by the
court, would indeed create a major drain upon the program's funds
in contradiction of the legislature's goal of supplying funds to disa-
bled employees during temporary absences. Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has long maintained, as recognized by the instant
majority, that fiscal considerations are legitimate concerns "in the
area of economics and social welfare.""0 In creating a benefits pro-
gram, a state seeks a balanced package of many benefits that best
serve overall employee needs. Since no benefits package can satisfy
all wants of all employees, a state must seek to utilize its benefits
dollars in the best overall way.' The instant court admits that the
proposed extension of coverage would increase the contribution level
and premiums approximately forty percent. 2 Furthermore, separate
studies indicate that the annual cost of adding the requested bene-
fits to disability plans now in effect in the United States would be
in excess of 1,300,000,000 dollars. 3 National statistics from the
58. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972) citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
59. Post-Trial Brief for Defendant at 61 n.73, Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., - F.
Supp. - (E.D. Va. 1974), [hereinafter cited as Post-Trial Brief].
60. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485 (1970). The dissent in the instant decision concurs. 359 F. Supp. at 805.
61. See Post-Trial Brief, supra note 59, at 59.
62. The court stated that the cost increase could be met by requiring workers to contrib-
ute an additional .364% of their salary and increasing the maximum annual contribution from
$85 to $119. 359 F. Supp. at 798.
63. See Post-Trial Brief, supra note 59, at 65. One of the studies was made by Alexander
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closely analogous employee sickness and accident insurance plans
reveal that, whereas the cost per unit of benefit for a female em-
ployee is approximately 170 percent of that for a male employee
when no maternity benefits are provided, the female cost per unit
of benefit exceeds male costs by over 300 percent when full matern-
ity benefits are provided. 4 In light of these facts the legislature's
decision to delete pregnancy-related disabilities appears neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable. Although it may be argued that section
2626 is thus constitutionally sound, it nevertheless is apparent that
approximately fifty percent of pregnant workers could benefit legiti-
mately from the additional coverage due to their intent to return to
work after pregnancy. Numerous legislative alternatives are avail-
able that would mitigate the financial strain of either total coverage
or noncoverage on all parties. First, defendant's fear of program
abuse by women seeking employment primarily to finance delivery
of their children could be eliminated entirely by requiring female
workers to sign a letter of intent to return to work in the event they
become pregnant and give birth. Only women so agreeing would be
afforded maternity coverage. The statement would necessarily con-
tain a confession of judgment in the amount of benefits received to
guard against unscrupulous employees who violate their pledges.
Based upon statistics of women who presently do not return to work
after giving birth, this would reduce claims and, therefore, costs
forty to fifty percent.65 Secondly, because of the extraordinary ex-
pense of pregnancy-related disability coverage and the fact that
modern contraceptives have for all practical purposes, rendered
pregnancy a voluntary condition, it has been suggested that employ-
ees should be given the option of maternity coverage, but only if
they are willing to bear a portion of the additional cost. Perhaps the
best approach would be a combination of these two suggestions with
the state insurance program bearing a portion of the increased cost.
Mandatory letters of intent to return to work-entailing a cost re-
duction of fifty percent-coupled with participants contributing one
half of the pregnancy-related premiums would reduce the economic
drain on the diability insurance program by seventy-five percent.
This plan would limit the program to persons intending to return
Bailie, the actuary in charge of actuarial functions for group insurance for Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. and a Fellow in the Society of Actuaries. Id. at 65 n.77. Presently, only 4 other
states plus a number of private concerns offer disability insurance covering pregnancy-related
disabilities. Walker, Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 HASTINGs L.J.
277, 285 (1971).
64. See Post-Trial Brief supra note 59, at 64.
65. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
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to the work force and provide the coverage at a much lower rate than
available privately without placing an inequitable financial strain
on nonpregnant members of the work force."8
Criminal Procedure-Grand Juries-
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases
Does Not Apply to Grand Jury Proceedings
Respondent, a witness before a federal grand jury investigating
loansharking activities, refused to testify on the ground that its
questions were based on evidence seized by federal agents from his
place of business' during a search alleged to be violative of fourth
amendment protections.2 The evidence had been discovered during
a search made pursuant to a warrant issued in connection with an
investigation of illegal gambling operations. The warrant specified
that the object of the search was the discovery and seizure of book-
making records and wagering paraphernalia. 3 After a hearing on
respondent's motion to suppress the evidence' under Rule 41(e) of
66. Two additional solutions have been suggested. First, most health insurance policies
do not provide benefits for conditions that predate the time of hire or require a one year
waiting period for maternity benefits. A waiting period would prevent women from seeking a
job primarily to finance delivery of their children. Getman, The Emerging Constitutional
Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 S. CT. REv. 157, 178 (1972). Secondly, the California
legislature in 1972 passed a bill (vetoed by the governor) that covered only abnormal compli-
cations of pregnancy, excluded disabilities arising from therapeutic abortions, and provided
necessary financing by increasing the maximum annual contribution from $85 to $95. 359 F.
Supp. 792, 804-05 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
1. Respondent's home and automobile were also searched, but those searches were not
involved in this litigation.
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
(he place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. An affidavit submitted in support of the application for the warrant contained infor-
mation derived from statements by confidential informants of the F.B.I., from physical sur-
veillance conducted by the F.B.I., and from court-authorized electronic survillance. During
the search a federal agent found evidence linking respondent to a loansharking operation that
the agent knew was under investigation by the United States Attorney's office.
4. Respondent initially had refused to testify, invoking his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. When the government requested the district court to grant respon-
dent transactional immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970), because he was not the
target of the loansharking investigation, respondent succeeded in receiving a postponement
of a hearing on the government's application so that he could prepare this motion to suppress
the evidence.
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 the district court found
that the search warrant had been issued without probable cause and
the search had exceeded the scope of the warrant. The evidence was
ordered returned to respondent, and it further was ordered that
respondent need not answer any of the grand jury's questions based
on the suppressed evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed,7 holding that the exclusionary rule of the
fourth amendment may be invoked by a witness before the grand
jury to bar questioning based on evidence obtained in an unlawful
search and seizure.' On writ of certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court, held, reversed. Because an extension of the exclusion-
ary rule to grand jury proceedings would achieve only a speculative
and minimal advance in deterring police misconduct at the expense
of substantially impeding the role of the grand jury, a witness before
a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that
they are based on evidence seized from him in an unlawful search
and seizure. United States v. Calandra, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974).
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule, which renders other-
wise reliable evidence inadmissible in court when obtained in an
unlawful search and seizure,9 is a doctrine of relatively recent ori-
gin.'0 Presently, it is the judiciary's sole method of protecting the
vital constitutional guarantees of the fourth amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures; yet, its justifications and con-
5. The rule states in part: "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may
move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the
property and to suppress for the use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1)
the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face,
or (3) the property seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable
cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5) the
warrant was illegally executed." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
6. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
7. 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972).
8. The offer by the government to grant respondent immunity was deemed irrelevant
to the decision. Id. at 1223.
9. The exclusionary rule also requires the suppression of confessions, Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and identification testimony, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), obtained in violation of the fifth and sixth
amendments, as well as evidence obtained by means so shocking as to violate the fifth
amendment due process clause, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
10. Appearing initially as a suggestion in dicta in 1886, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, the rule was applied by the Court in 1914 in its holding that illegally seized evidence is
inadmissible in the federal courts when the seizure has been made by federal or state officers
acting under color of federal authority. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In 1949,
the fourth amendment freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures was applied to the
states. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Twelve years later Mapp v. Ohio imposed the
exclusionary rule on the states as a required method of enforcement. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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stitutional foundations have been hotly debated, especially since
Mapp v. Ohio" applied the rule to the states in 1961.12 There, the
Court termed the rule "logically and constitutionally necessary"
and an "essential part of the right to privacy.' ' 3 Prior to Mapp, the
Court had not articulated any constitutional foundations for the
rule with such clarity. It was spoken of as a remedy and its necessity
was examined in the light of its practical justifications. The "nor-
mative" or "judicial integrity" rationale, which focuses on the evil
of government participation in illegal police conduct, is advanced
as one justification for the rule. In Weeks v. United States,4 the
Court that formulated the rule stated, "[t]o sanction such proceed-
ings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not
open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for
the protection of the people against such unauthorized action."'5
Although the normative rationale has received recognition in vir-
tually every significant search and seizure case since Weeks, the
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. See, e.g., Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 80
(1969); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929,
951-53 (1965); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State
and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083 (1959); LaFave, Improving Police Performance
Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391 (1965); LaFave & Remington, Controlling
the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH.
L. REV. 987 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. REv. 665 (1970); Note, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding
the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129 (1973).
13. 367 U.S. at 656.
14. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
15. Id. at 394. Perhaps the most eloquent spokesman for the judicial integrity rationale
was Justice Brandeis, who, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928),
stated:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected
to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order
to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
One writer has criticized the proposition that the exclusionary rule is necessary for judicial
integrity, however, by observing that no such rule exists in other common law jurisdictions
such as England and Canada "whose courts are otherwise regarded as models of judicial
decorum and fairness." Oaks, supra note 12, at 669.
16. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 636 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 223 (1960); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920).
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recent trend has been to emphasize the "deterrence" rationale, a
second justification for the rule, which assumes that the exclusion
of evidence obtained by illegal means will deter law enforcement
officers from engaging in illegal behavior." The sources of this shift
in emphasis are not clear. The leading cases, beginning with Weeks,
made few references to the deterrence factor prior to 1960.18 Rather,
the Court was concerned with the thorny problem of the means by
which a criminal defendant's fourth amendment rights could be
protected comprehensively and with the continuing necessity of
maintaining the integrity of the judicial process. In 1960, however,
Elkins v. United States" established the doctrine that deterrence is
the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule.2 1 Justice Stewart, in
an otherwise well-documented history of the rule, simply stated the
deterrence rationale without citation to any previous decisions of
the Court.2' The present supremacy of the deterrence rationale has
had a significant impact on the scope of the rule's application. The
rule almost exclusively has been restricted to criminal trials, 22 any
17. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Deterrence was an
important consideration in the Court's decisions on whether Mapp and the new rules on
interrogation warnings and lineup formalities should have retrospective application. Linklet-
ter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (Mapp); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)
(Miranda warnings); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (lineup formalities).
18. In applying the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures to the states, the Court in Wolf v. Colorado recognized that "in practice the exclusion
of evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches. ... 338 U.S. 25,
31 (1949).
19. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
20. "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it." Id. at 217.
21. A dissenting opinion by Justice Jackson in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
181 (1949), was quoted as support for Justice Stewart's conclusion. Justice Jackson's state-
ment cannot be read, however, as an unqualified affirmance of the deterrence rationale.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12, 913 (1955), in which California
adopted the exclusionary rule, was also quoted as support for the deterrence rationale.
22. In United States v. Blue the Court reversed a district court order dismissing an
indictment for income tax evasion on the ground that evidence seized in violation of the fifth
amendment (statements made by defendant in an earlier Tax Court proceeding) was used in
returning an indictment. 384 U.S. 251 (1966). The Court stated,
Even if we assume that the Government did acquire incriminating evidence in violation
of the Fifth Amendment, Blue would at most be entitled to suppress the evidence and
its fruits if they were sought to be used against him at trial. . . . Our numerous preced-
ents ordering the exclusion of. . . illegally seized evidence assume implicitly that the
remedy does not extend to barring the prosecution altogether. So drastic a step might
advance marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, but it would also
increase to an intolerable degree interference with the public interest in having the guilty
brought to book.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
deterrent effect that might be achieved outside the trial setting
being found too slight to justify expansion. Such a balancing ap-
proach would be inappropriate under the judicial integrity doc-
trine.23 Reliance upon the deterrence rationale also has resulted in
several specific criticisms of the exclusionary rule: (1) It is improba-
ble that police will be deterred from illegal searches by h rule whose
direct effects are felt only at the prosecutorial level; (2) Police often
are not interested in convictions so much as in apprehension of
suspects and in seizure of evidence such as weapons, narcotics, and
gambling equipment that will endanger the public; (3) Police are
more conscious of internal police norms-both superior officers and
patrolmen often feeling that the courts are "tying the hands" of the
police-than of external court decisions that are often too complex
for the average policeman to understand.? These considerations
have led to proposals for a fourth amendment remedy that would
not exclude relevant evidence but would still deter unlawful police
conduct. An effective tort action has been a commonly suggested
vehicle. 25 The tort remedy proponents appear to assume that the
exclusionary rule is ineffective as a deterrent and that deterrence is
the primary rationale for invoking any remedy for an unconstitu-
tional police search. 26 While critics of the exclusionary rule assert
Id. at 255.
The rule also has been denied application in sentencing proceedings, United States v. Schi-
pani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971), and parole revocation
hearings, In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970).
23. In Blue the Court indicated that it was balancing the deterrent effect of applying
the exclusionary rule against the danger to society in allowing a guilty person to go free.
Holmes and Brandeis in their Olmstead dissents recognized that one cost of unconstitutional
police searches would be that guilty persons would be released. Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 470, 484 (1928). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 730 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 397 (1968) (Black, J., dis-
senting).
24. See generally Oaks, supra note 12, at 706-54.
25. Chief Justice Burger became the leading spokesman for this position in his now
famous dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See
also Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493
(1955); Oaks, supra note 12, at 717-19; Symposium on Police Tort Liability, 16 CLv.-MAa.
L. REv. 397 (1967).
Congress has entered the picture with proposed legislation providing that evidence would
not be excluded if unlawfully seized unless the court, after considering all the circumstances
surrounding the search, concluded that a "substantial" violation of the fourth amendment
had occurred. The bill also would amend the Federal Tort Claims Act to provide the victim
of an illegal search with the right to sue the government for damages in federal district court.
S. 881, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See generally Note, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule:
Congressional Assault on Mapp v. Ohio, 61 GEO. L.J. 1453 (1973).
26. Chief Justice Burger's feelings on the deterrence factor were voiced long before his
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that its effectiveness as a deterrent is doubtful, a majority of the
Court has seemingly accepted the deterrence rationale as the para-
mount consideration for almost fifteen years. The theory has never
been adequately tested-by the Court 27 or anyone else.2 8 The
defenders of the exclusionary rule generally have taken the position
that it is "the best we have." 9 As noted by one commentator,
"[t]he fact that there is little agreement and little evidence that
the exclusionary rule does deter police lawlessness is much less sig-
nificant. . . than the fact that there is much agreement and much
evidence that all other existing alternatives do not."3
Previously, only one Supreme Court case, Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States,31 has dealt directly with the applicability of
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings.
Traditionally, the scope of the grand jury's powers to investigate
suspected criminal activity, while not unlimited, has been ex-
tremely broad.32 It may compel the production of evidence or the
testimony of witnesses unhampered by the technical rules of proce-
dure and evidence associated with a criminal trial.33 The grand jury
Bivens dissent: "I suggest that the notion that suppression of evidence in a given case effec-
tively deters the future action of the particular policeman or of policemen generally was never
more than wishful thinking on the part of the courts." Burger, Who Will Watch the Watch-
man, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 12 (1964).
27. In Elkins Justice Stewart admitted that there was no data upon which to conclude
that the exclusionary rule acts as a deterrent. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218
(1960). The Court has, for the most part, simply accepted the fact that it is a deterrent
without further discussion. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
28. The author of perhaps the most comprehensive study to date concluded that the
exclusionary rule is not an effective deterrent and that it should be abolished as soon as an
alternative tort remedy can be instituted. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. Rev. 665, 756-57 (1970).
29. Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 65, 74
(1957).
30. Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and
Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1150 (1959).
31. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
32. For background on the grand jury process see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
700-02 (1972); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1956); Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273, 279-83 (1919); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312-23 (7th rev. ed.
1956); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 151 (reprint 2d ed. 1923).
33. The grand jury is subject, however, to certain restraints. The grand jury must rely
on the court to compel production of evidence and testimony, and the court may quash or
modify a subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
17(c). The grand jury may not violate a valid privilege, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421
(1932), and may force a witness to answer self-incriminatory questions only if the witness is
granted immunity coextensive with his fifth amendment privilege. Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441 (1972). Neither may it compel a person to produce private books and papers
that would tend to incriminate him. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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proceeding is not an adversary hearing but rather is an ex parte
investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against an indi-
vidual. Doubts as to whether any particular person will be subject
to an accusation of a crime have not limited the scope of its in-
quiry,3 and as the Court recently stated, "[w]hen the grand jury
is performing its investigatory function into a general problem area
• . .society's interest is best served by a thorough and extensive
investigation. '3 5 The Silverthorne decision, however, appears to
limit rather dramatically the grand jury's investigative powers re-
lating to evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment. In
that case, unlawfully seized documents were presented to a grand
jury that had already indicted defendants. The illegal evidence was
returned to defendants upon their petition to the district court.
Later, the prosecutor caused the grand jury to issue subpoenas
duces tecum to defendants to produce the evidence. They refused
to comply and were cited for contempt. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the subpoenas were invalid because they were
based on information obtained from an unlawful seizure. The scope
of Silverthorne was left unclear. On the one hand it seemed to
indicate that a grand jury witness who is an aggrieved person has
standing to challenge the sources of evidence at grand jury proceed-
ings. On the other hand, the case's precedential value was dimin-
ished by the unique factual context in which it arose. 6 First, the
seized evidence already had been ruled illegal in a prior independent
proceeding. Secondly, the defendants were already under criminal
indictment and thus could be said to have invoked the rule on the
basis of their status as criminal defendants rather than as mere
witnesses.
In the instant decision, Mr. Justice Powell speaking for the
majority, 37 initially reviewed the nature and scope of the grand
jury's traditional powers and concluded that the grand jury's inves-
tigative warrant must be broad if its public responsibility is to be
discharged adequately. The Court noted previous decisions that
manifested a disinclination to allow "litigious interference" with
grand jury proceedings that would turn them into a preliminary
34. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
35. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972).
36. The decision also suffers from the extreme brevity of Justice Holmes's majority
opinion.




trial on the merits and result in protracted interruptions. 8 Turning
to the exclusionary rule, the Court stated that the rule's purpose is
not to redress the injury to the search victim; rather, it is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights gen-
erally by deterring unlawful police conduct. 9 The Court then ap-
plied a balancing test to the question of the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to the grand jury process." It found that any deter-
rent effect that might accrue by application of the exclusionary rule
to grand jury proceedings is "undoubtedly minimal" and "uncertain
at best," reasoning that the incentive to disregard the fourth
amendment solely to obtain an indictment is "substantially ne-
gated" since illegally seized evidence would be inadmissible at a
subsequent trial and a prosecutor would be unlikely to seek an in-
dictment when a conviction could not be obtained.' On the other
hand, Justice Powell found it "evident" that this extension of the
exclusionary rule would seriously impede the effective and expedi-
tious discharge of the grand jury's duties.12 Declaring that the deriv-
ative use of illegally obtained evidence is a question not of rights but
of remedies,43 the Court concluded that the benefit of any possible
incremental deterrent effect was outweighed by the damage to the
grand jury institution that would result by applying the exclusion-
ary rule to its proceedings."
Mr. Justice Brennan filed a vigorous dissent,45 assaulting the
majority's position as reflecting a "startling misconception" or
"purposeful rejection" of the historical purpose and objectives of the
exclusionary rule. He stated that curtailment of the evil of uncon-
38. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Gelbard v. United States, 408
U.S. 41, 69 (1972) (White, J., concurring); United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971);
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
39. Justice Powell in a footnote admitted that there is disagreement over the practical
efficacy of the exclusionary rule and that empirical statistics are not available on its deterrent
effect. He stated, however, that the instant case did not present an occasion to consider the
extent of the rule's efficacy in criminal trials. 94 S. Ct. at 620 n.5.
40. "[W]e must weigh the potential injury to the historic role and functions of the
grand jury against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in this context." Id. at 620.
41. Id. at 621-22.
42. The Court noted that the force of this argument was well illustrated by the facts of
the instant case. Almost 21/2 years had elapsed since respondent was summoned to appear
and testify before the grand jury. Id. at 621.
43. According to the majority, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated at the time of the illegal search and derivative use of this evidence in
grand jury proceedings worked no new fourth amendment wrong. Id. at 623.
44. The Silverthorne decision was examined by the majority in a footnote and found
"certainly not controlling." Id. at 622 n.8. See note 54 infra.
45. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall.
46. 94 S. Ct. at 624.
19741
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
stitutional searches and seizures was, at best, only a desired effect
of the exclusionary rule. The true concern of its authors, Justice
Brennan reasoned, was to fashion an enforcement tool to give con-
tent and meaning to the fourth amendment guarantees and to ena-
ble the judiciary to avoid any taint of partnership in official lawless-
ness.47 The dissent rejected Justice Powell's conclusion that the ex-
clusionary rule is merely a judicially created remedy. Rather, Jus-
tice Brennan agreed with the Mapp Court's statement that the rule
is "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments .... ",48 An analysis of the leading cases, primarily
Silverthorne, which Justice Brennan characterized as "plainly con-
trolling," convinced the dissenters that the majority's holding is "at
war" with the decisions that developed the exclusionary rule and
"discounts to the point of extinction" the judicial integrity doc-
trine. 9 Moreover, the dissent feared that the instant decision would
leave a vital constitutional right without a remedy in many situa-
tions. The majority's suggestion that the grand jury witness' fourth
amendment rights would be protected by the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence at a subsequent criminal trial was labeled "no an-
swer" since the witness compelled to testify might never be brought
to trial. His possible remedy of damages in tort was viewed as ena-
bling "officialdom to profit from its lawlessness if it is willing to pay
a price."5 Justice Brennan conceded that the exclusionary rule does
not provide that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible against
anyone for any purpose, but distinguished those individuals whose
fourth amendment rights have not been violated from those whose
constitutional rights have actually been abridged.5 Finally, the dis-
senters feared that the instant decision signalled the first step to-
ward abrogation of the exclusionary rule altogether in search and
seizure cases, reasoning that application of the exclusionary rule at
47. Weeks, the decision which fashioned the rule, was quoted at length for this proposi-
tion.
48. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
49. 94 S. Ct. at 626. Silverthorne was interpreted as holding that a grand jury must be
denied access to relevant but illegally seized papers. The dissent also relied upon Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), in which the Court was called upon to interpret § 2515 of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20
(1970). There the contempt conviction of a grand jury witness who refused to testify on the
ground that interrogation was to be based upon information derived from an illegal wiretap
and electronic surveillance of the witness was reversed. The statutory provision at issue,
however, specifically excluded the use of this evidence in grand jury proceedings.
50. 94 S. Ct. at 628.
51. For cases dealing with the standing of an individual to move for suppression of
illegally seized evidence see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), and Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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trial could not further the goal of deterrence significantly, if its
application to grand jury proceedings fails to do so.5
The instant decision marks a significant development in the
evolution of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. The Court
clearly stated that the exclusionary rule's applicability does not
extend to extra-trial proceedings when such use will not serve a
significant deterrent purpose. The grand jury's historic func-
tions-determining whether probable cause exists to believe a crime
has been committed and protecting citizens against unfounded
criminal prosecutions-were found to outweigh any speculative de-
terrent effect that might occur by imposing the exclusionary rule on
grand jury proceedings. More important perhaps is the Court's char-
acterization of the exclusionary rule as a mere judicial remedy that
is not inextricably linked to, or required by, the fourth amendment.
Mapp, however, indicated that the exclusionary rule is demanded
by the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 3 This constitutional
foundation, if it had been recognized in the instant decision, seem-
ingly would have required exclusion without regard to a balancing
analysis. The justification and effects of the rule should yield to its
constitutional underpinnings. Ultimately these foundations would
prohibit any use being made of illegally obtained evidence and
would deny the courts authority to decide at what stages of the
criminal process the exclusionary rule would apply once the consti-
tutional violation is ascertained. When the rule's constitutional
basis is removed and its deterrent effect undermined, there seems
little justification for retaining it, and the dissent's fear that this
decision may portend abrogation of the rule entirely seems well-
founded. The Court's decision, moreover, fails to confront ade-
quately several key considerations raised both in previous decisions
and by the dissent. First, the majority's summary disposition in a
footnote of the Silverthorne decision does not satisfy the preceden-
tial value that should have been accorded the case. The fact that
Silverthorne dealt with grand jury witnesses already under indict-
ment should not be a controlling distinction.54 Justice Holmes was
.52. 94 S. Ct. at 628.
53. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
54. The majority distinguished Silverthorne in the following language:
There, plaintiff-in-error had previously been indicted by the grand jury and thus could
invoke the exclusionary rule on the basis of their status as criminal defendants. Moreo-
ver, the Government's interest in recapturing the original documents was founded on a
belief that they might be useful in the criminal prosecution already authorized by the
grand jury. It did not appear that the grand jury needed the documents to perform its
investigative or accusatorial functions. Thus, the primary consequence of the Court's
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not concerned with this fact in Silverthorne; instead, he apparently
approached that case with exactly the same issues in mind as were
raised in the instant case. If, as the majority asserts, deterrence is
the major factor to be considered in applying the exclusionary rule,
any distinctions between Silverthorne and the instant decision are
rendered even more insignificant. To conclude that application of
the rule in the Silverthorne situation would deter unlawful police
conduct, but that its application in the instant factual context
would not, seems little more than an arbitrary assumption.
Silverthorne should not coexist with the instant decision but rather
should have been overruled." Secondly, and perhaps most impor-
tant, the instant decision almost completely ignores the judicial
integrity rationale, again relegating its discussion of the issue to a
footnote. 6 The Court's use of a balancing approach in applying the
exclusionary rule is a de facto abrogation of the judicial integrity
doctrine since this doctrine exists independently of any deterrent
considerations and the conditions necessary for its application occur
at the time of the unconstitutional search and seizure. Weeks and
Mapp, the leading exclusionary rule cases, placed great emphasis on
the integrity doctrine, 57 which in its requirement of judicial clean
hands would seem to mandate exclusion regardless of the type of
proceeding. The Weeks Court struggled with the problem of formu-
lating a comprehensive remedy that would vindicate the violation
of fourth amendment rights. The exclusionary rule, while unable to
undo the constitutional wrong previously committed, prohibited
that wrong from compounding itself by finding sanction in the
courts. These considerations indicate that the exclusionary rule is
not only "the best we have" but that it is also the only possible
sanction that will satisfy the judicial integrity rationale. An effec-
tive tort remedy for illegal search victims is unrelated to the judicial
integrity doctrine. Remedies in tort have been available in some
jurisdictions throughout the existence of the exclusionary rule. The
possibility of a jury finding in favor of a search victim in a suit
decision was to exclude the evidence from the subsequent criminal trial. Finally, prior
to the issuance of the grand jury subpoenas, there had been a judicial determination that
the search and seizure was illegal. The claim of plaintiffs-in-error was not raised for the
first time in a pre-indictment motion to suppress requiring interruption of grand jury
proceedings.
94 S. Ct. at 622 n.8.
55. The majority opinion noted that to the extent Silverthorne's "broad dictum" might
suggest a different result in the instant case, it had been "substantially undermined" by
subsequent cases. 94 S. Ct. at 622 n.8.
56. 94 S. Ct. at 623 n.11.
57. See notes 14 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
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against the police, however, has been virtually nonexistent. 8 Fi-
nally, the Court's use of the deterrence rationale itself is not satis-
factory. That the exclusion of evidence will deter unlawful police
conduct is yet to be proved, but even assuming that deterrence is
the prime motivation for excluding illegally seized evidence, it
would seem that the deterrent effect of its application should be
presumed, especially with respect to pre-trial proceedings such as
grand juries. The burden of proof of nondeterrence would then shift
to the government. 9 The instant decision held, in effect, exactly the
opposite. Indications are, however, that the exclusionary rule does
not have a significant deterrent effect-police searches are made
with a number of considerations in mind, with the possibility of
conviction at some future date not necessarily the primary one. °
The instant decision offered the Court an ideal opportunity to reex-
amine its position established in Elkins that deterrence is the pri-
mary reason for the rule. The Court, however, perpetuated a ques-
tionable rationale for a vital constitutional doctrine. This weak
foundation could indeed bring the entire exclusionary rule down if
and when it is shown that deterrence is not a significant effect of-
the rule when applied at trial. Viewed in the context of other recent
decisions of the Court regarding search and seizure,61 the instant
decision is not surprising. The full extent of the present Court's
willingness to reverse the Warren Court's stance on illegal searches
remains to be seen. The groundwork has been laid, however, for
58. Criminal sanctions also have been provided in some jurisdictions, but the hesitancy
of a jury to convict and of a prosecutor to bring charges has made a criminal remedy (which
would, of course, truly serve a deterrent purpose) one in theory only. See Oaks, supra note
12, at 673.
59. In Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court set aside the contempt
citation of a grand jury witness who refused to testify on the ground that interrogation was
to be based on information obtained from illegal wiretapping and electronic surveillance. The
decision upheld the literal language of 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970), which provides specifically
for exclusion of such evidence from grand jury proceedings. This congressional application of
the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings seems to vitiate the majority's fears of litigious
interference with the grand jury process since Congress obviously was willing to sacrifice the
possibility of an indictment and ultimate conviction to protect a grand jury witness' right to
privacy. The majority felt that reliance upon Gelbard was "misplaced" since the statute
"represented a congressional effort to afford special safeguards against the unique problems
posed by misuse of wiretapping and electronic surveillance." 94 S. Ct. at 623 n.11.
60. See Oaks, supra note 12, at 706-57.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973) (full search allowed when
traffic offender placed under custodial arrest); Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973)
(same); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (no warrant required to take scrapings
from under fingernails of murder suspect, although suspect was not under arrest, had gone
to the police station voluntarily, and had not consented to the search).
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dramatic future developments by Congress"2 or the Court. 3
Securities Regulation-Rule 10b-5-Plaintiffs
Who Are Neither Purchasers nor Sellers of Secur-
ities May Recover Under Rule 10b-5 if Injured in
Their Capacity as Investors as a Direct Conse-
quence of Fraud in Connection with a Securities
Transaction
Defendant Dave Waite Pontiac, Inc., sold its automobile leas-
ing business to Bank Service Corporation, in which plaintiffs were
shareholders, in exchange for Bank Service stock. As additional
consideration for the sale, plaintiffs guaranteed certain notes, paya-
ble to defendant General Motors Acceptance Corporation, which
Bank Service had assumed.' When the leasing business failed and
Bank Service defaulted on the notes, GMAC sued plaintiffs in state
court to recover on the guarantees. Claiming that the value of the
assets had been misrepresented and seeking rescission of the guar-
antees, plaintiffs then filed suit in federal court alleging fraud in
connection with the sale of securities in violation of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and Rule 10b-5.1 Defendants
62. See note 25 supra. The constitutionality of the proposed legislation now is virtually
certain.
63. One apparent consequence of the Burger Court's turnabout regarding search and
seizure cases has been a reduction in the number of cases appealed to the Supreme Court.
Defense attorneys fear that the Court may overrule a decision of the Warren years. Wall
Street J., Feb. 14, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
1. Bank Service assumed the liabilities of the business, which included loans by GMAC
to finance automobile purchases. Plaintiffs guaranteed future liabilities as well as the notes.
2. Section 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
3. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of a
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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contended that since plaintiffs had not purchased or sold securities,
they lacked standing to sue under Rule 10b-5.4 The district court
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held, reversed and re-
manded. Plaintiffs who are not buyers or sellers of securities may
obtain relief under Rule 10b-5 if they are injured in their capacity
as investors as a direct result of fraud in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of securities. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1974) (No. 73-1323).
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes
the SEC to make rules prohibiting fraud in connection with sales
or purchases of securities, "in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors."5 To provide prohibitions against fraud by pur-
chasers of securities similar to those against fraud by sellers found
in section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,6 the SEC adopted Rule
10b-5 in 1942. 7 Although neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 explic-
itly provides for it, a private right of action under the Rule has been
implied uniformly since a 1946 case, Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co.," and was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1971.1 The basis
for this implied right, as explained in Kardon, is the principle of tort
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
4. Plaintiffs argued that they were purchasers or sellers of a security by virtue of their
delivery of the guarantees, their effective "forced purchase" of the notes on default, or the
issue of the stock by Bank Service to defendants. They further urged the court to abandon
the purchaser-seller requirement for standing under Rule 10b-5.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
6. Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
The language of Rule 10b-5 follows this section closely. See note 3 supra.
7. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942); see 1 A. BROMBERG,
SECURrITES LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5 § 2.2 (420) (1973).
8. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
9. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
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law that a violation of a statute creates a right of action in persons
injured if the intent of the statute is to protect both the class to
which the plaintiff belongs and the interest that has been invaded.',
In attempting to impose some limits upon the scope of Rule 10b-5
as a basis for a private right of action, courts have applied concepts
of reliance," causation,'2 scienter,'3 and privity" derived from the
common-law tort action of deceit.'" With the elimination of the
requirement that the defendant be a purchaser or seller of
securities,'" however, and the uncertainty surrounding reliance and
scienter as elements of the 10b-5 cause of action,'7 the Rule has
undergone a dramatic expansion.'" Although the Supreme Court has
stated that the Rule should be construed flexibly in order to accom-
plish its purpose of protecting investors from fraud,'" the doctrine
that plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities, first stated
in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 2" nevertheless has remained as
a persistent limitation to actions under Rule 10b-5. In Birnbaum,
the Second Circuit looked to the administrative history of the Rule
and reasoned that it was intended to reach only the types of fraud
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965):
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the require-
ments of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found
to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded,
and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm
results.
11. E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
12. E.g., Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
13. E.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
14. E.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
15. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 7, at §§ 8.1-.9; 3 L. Loss, SECURmES REGULATION
1763-70 (1961).
16. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
17. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 7, at §§ 8.4, 8.6, 8.9; Epstein, The Scienter Require-
ment in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. REv. 482 (1970); Note, The Nature and Scope
of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions under SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 363 (1973).
18. "In recent years, the rule has been applied in such a variety of situations that one
can scarcely find an issue of the advance sheets of the Federal Supplement and Federal
Reporter that does not contain an opinion on § 10(b)." Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877
(5th Cir. 1970).
19. "Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively." Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
20. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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normally associated with sales or purchases of securities (the "first
branch") and that it "extended protection only to the defrauded
purchaser or seller" (the "second branch"). While the first branch
has since been discredited,2' the second branch is well established,
and is now usually characterized as a "standing" requirement. 2
Some courts, like the Fifth Circuit in Herpich v. Wallace,23 have
regarded the requirement as a constitutional and jurisdictional ne-
cessity on the theory that only plaintiffs who assert interests argua-
bly within the zone of interests to be protected by a statute have
standing under the Constitution. 2 Others have upheld the standing
requirement on the ground that such a well-established interpreta-
tion should be altered only by Congress,2 or that it is necessary to
restrict the expansion of federal corporate law into areas better left
to the states, 21 or to prevent a flood of litigation based on unprovea-
ble allegations.Y The courts have modified the doctrine, however, by
creating numerous exceptions and by giving the requirement an
extremely flexible interpretation. For example, persons with an un-
consummated contract to buy or sell,2 minority shareholders in
short-form mergers,29 issuers of securities,30 merging corporations,3'
21. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
22. See, e.g., id. at 13 n.10; Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973); Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798 (2d Cir. 1969).
23. 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
24. But see H.K. Porter, Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153, 166 (D.R.I. 1972),
aft'd, 482 F.2d 421 (lst Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit applied the 2-part standard used by the
Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 152-53 (1970) ("whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him
injury in fact" and "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitu-
tional guarantee in question."). It found that only purchasers or sellers could satisfy the
second requirement, characterizing Rule lob-5 as protecting only the right to buy or sell
without fraud. For a discussion of standing in the general constitutional context see Davis,
The Liberalized Lau, of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 450 (1970).
25. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1972); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d
963, 969 (2d Cir. 1969).
26. Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456-57 (6th Cir. 1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v.
Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1969).
27. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 147 (9th Cir. 1973) (dissent-
ing opinion).
28. See Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Goodman v. Hentz
& Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Note, Inroads on the Necessity for a Consummated
Purchase or Sale Under Rule 10b-5, 1969 DUKE L.J. 349. Contra, Keers & Co. v. American
Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The contract exception can be
justified by the language of § 3(a) of the 1934 Act, which expressly includes contracts to buy
and sell within the definitions of the terms "buy" and "sell". 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13), (14)
(1970).
29. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
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personal representatives of purchasers and sellers, 3 and beneficiar-
ies of trusts whose trustees buy or sell 33 have all been permitted to
sue under Rule 10b-5. Similarly, under a flexible reading of the
requirement, a plaintiff who is dissuaded fraudulently from entering
into a transaction,but who eventually does buy or sell, may have
standing through the later transaction .3 The Second Circuit further
limited the applicability of the purchaser-seller requirement in
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, 3 holding that it did not apply to
suits for injunctive relief. The court's reasoning rested on the prem-
ise that the Birnbaum rule is' primarily a means to ensure that
plaintiff can prove damages and causation. According to the Second
Circuit, plaintiffs who are not purchasers or sellers cannot prove a
loss causally related to a purchase or sale, and therefore cannot
recover damages; however, this inability does not bar a suit for
injunctive relief because such suits do not require proof of damages.
Although the court in Mutual Shares limited its holding to prospec-
tive injunctive relief and seemed to reaffirm Birnbaum in damage
actions, that opinion is the source of the reasoning in two district
court cases that expressly disavow the purchaser-seller requirement.
In Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc.,31 the New Jersey district court
granted retrospective injunctive relief, in the form of rescission of
an election of corporate directors, to plaintiffs who were neither
buyers nor sellers of securities. The court stated that it declined to
Such plaintiffs are characterized as "forced sellers" since they will eventually be forced to
convert their shares into either cash or stock in the surviving corporation.
30. E.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
31. E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967). This is based on the reasoning that the exchange of stock of one corporation for
that of another pursuant to a merger should be given the same protection as an ordinary
exchange of securities for cash. See generally 26 VAND. L. REv. 887 (1973).
32. E.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (state
insurance commissioner representing insurance company); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co.,
341 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1972) (administrator of estate representing decedent).
33. James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Heyman v. Heyman, 356
F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The courts in these 2 cases reasoned that the beneficiary is
the person whose interests are at stake in the transaction, and therefore the policies expressed
in Birnbaum are not violated by granting him standing.
34. E.g., Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1969); Travis v.
Anthes Imperial Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252
F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Contra, Hirsch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
311 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). These cases refer to plaintiffs as "forced sellers," but the
term "delayed sellers" is more accurate.
35. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
36. 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
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follow Birnbaum because it found no such purchaser-seller require-
ment in the language of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 and because of
the trend to read the Rule broadly. In Young v. Seaboard Corp.,38
the Utah district court went further, giving standing to shareholders
of an insolvent bank to sue the management for damages. Stating
that the problem of proof should be left to the general law of dam-
ages, the court suggested that all plaintiffs who can show "a direct
and causal relationship between . .. fraud and the claimed in-
jury"39 should have the right to sue for damages as well as injunctive
relief. In addition to these two district courts, several other courts
have questioned the Birnbaum rule, but their comments have thus
far been confined to dicta." The SEC now also advocates its aban-
donment.4' Despite these indications of a trend away from the
purchaser-seller requirement, all but the Fourth and Seventh Cir-
cuits have adopted it,42 and the Supreme Court has never considered
the issue. 3 While Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.44 has often been
cited as adopting the requirement in the Seventh Circuit,45 that
court actually avoided ruling on the validity of the purchaser-seller
requirement by holding that the plaintiff, a merging corporation,
was a purchaser or seller. Thus, before the instant case, no court of
appeals had yet disavowed Birnbaum, although its status in the
Seventh Circuit was in doubt.
The instant court initially observed that defendants' alleged
conduct was undoubtedly a violation of Rule 10b-5, for which Bank
Service could have recovered damages. Assuming that plaintiffs
could not be characterized as purchasers or sellers of securities, the
37. Id. at 839.
38. 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973).
39. Id. at 495.
40. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Competitive
Associates, Inc. v. International Health Sciences, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,632, at 92,870 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Fabrikant v. Jacobellis, [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,686, at 99,017 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
41. In several recent cases challenging Birnbaum, the SEC has filed amicus curiae
briefs for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th
Cir. 1972).
42. H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Landy v. FDIC,
486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973); Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 433 (10th Cir. 1973); Mount
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792
(5th Cir. 1970); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999
(1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970). The Fourth Circuit has apparently never been forced to face the issue.
43. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.10 (1971).
44. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
45. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156 n.11 (3d Cir. 1973); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc.
v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 342 n.5 (9th Cir. 1972).
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court then reassessed the validity of the Birnbaum requirement in
order to determine their right to relief. It first distinguished this
requirement from that of standing in the constitutional sense, which
it interpreted as requiring only a sufficient interest in an actual
dispute to satisfy the article M case or controversy standard." It
decided that plaintiffs clearly had an interest sufficient to satisfy
this requirement. The court then reasoned that plaintiffs, although
not purchasers or sellers, nevertheless belonged to the class for
whose benefit Rule 10b-5 was adopted. It found that by creating
exceptions and modifications to the strict Birnbaum holding, the
courts have recognized tacitly that this protected class includes
more than just purchasers and sellers. Furthermore, the policy fa-
voring a broad construction of Rule 10b-5 was found to be inconsist-
ent with such a rigid delineation of the class. Having concluded that
the protected class includes more than just purchasers and sellers,
the court then examined and rejected policy arguments offered to
justify the purchaser-seller requirement. It regarded the desire to
avoid an increase in the judicial workload as an invalid reason for
denying relief to an injured plaintiff, and doubted that the demise
of Birnbaum would necessarily cause such an increase. It also re-
jected the argument that Birnbaum should be followed to maintain
consistency among the federal courts of appeals, stating that con-
flicts may be resolved by the Supreme Court. Considering the lan-
guage of section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and recent Supreme Court opin-
ions,47 the instant court concluded that the class protected by the
Rule included all "persons who, in their capacity as investors, suffer
significant injury as a direct consequence of fraud in connection
with a securities transaction."4 Applying this analysis to the facts
of the instant case, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs were
"investors" in the transaction since they were stockholders of Bank
Service, and that they were direct parties to the transaction since
they guaranteed the loans. It concluded that plaintiffs, as investors
and as principals in a fraudulent transaction, had standing to sue
under 10b-5.
As the first court of appeals to reject the Birnbaum doctrine,
the instant court may begin a trend that will eliminate the
purchaser-seller requirement in suits under Rule 10b-5. This result
has been both predicted and advocated by many commentators,"8
46. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
47. The court cited Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-
13 (1971).
48. 490 F.2d at 659.
49. E.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5,
[Vol. 27
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and there is nothing in the language of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5
to preclude it. On the contrary, it would effectuate their purposes
more fully by increasing private enforcement. Additionally, the
present rule, with its numerous exceptions and qualifications, fre-
quently produced illogical results. For example, under the
Birnbaum doctrine, an investor who calls his broker, tells him to sell
a certain security, and then is dissuaded from selling by the broker's
misrepresentations, has no standing to sue under Rule 10b-5; yet if
he sells the same stock six months later, he may, as a seller, have
standing to recover damages for fraud in the previous uncompleted
transaction.'" Standing in this situation is thus made to turn on a
fortuitous event occurring long after the violation of Rule 10b-5.
Several policy arguments have been advanced to justify the
Birnbaum requirement despite such arbitrary results. Although it
has been defended as a means of restraining the expansion of the
federal law of corporations into fields already covered by state law,
the requirement that plaintiff be a purchaser or seller bears no
relation to the presence or absence of state remedies, and is there-
fore an inappropriate expression of that policy. That the SEC did
not envisage the broad scope of the Rule when it was originally
promulgated is, in itself, an inadequate reason for continuing to
apply the Birnbaum requirement, especially since the SEC now
advocates its abandonment. The desire to eliminate spurious claims
by use of an arbitrary rule that also denies recovery to persons with
valid claims is not a legitimate consideration, since the function of
the court should be to decide in each case whether the proof is
sufficient to permit recovery. This leaves the desire to limit poten-
tial liability under Rule 10b-5 as a reason for retention of the
Birnbaum rule. In cases of fraud relating to securities traded on the
national exchanges, the number of potential plaintiffs who might
claim damages is tremendous even under the Birnbaum rule. The
courts' reluctance to expand further the scope of Rule 10b-5 is there-
fore understandable. The additional liability, however, will have
little effect on a defendant who already is bankrupted by his present
liability. Furthermore, it would be more appropriate to limit 10b-5
liability by strengthening the substantive requirements of the cause
54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate
Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289 (1971); Note,
Inroads on the Necessity for a Consummated Purchase or Sale Under Rule 10b-5, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 349; Note, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24
HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1973).
50. Compare Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), with
Morrow v. Schapiro, 334 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
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of action, since the purchaser-seller requirement bears little rela-
tionship to the policies of the Rule. Nevertheless, those circuits that
embraced the Birnbaum requirement enthusiastically only a few
years ago are unlikely to reverse themselves in the immediate fu-
ture. Even if the instant decision is not followed in other circuits,
however, it does create a conflict that may force the Supreme Court
to decide the issue at last. In view of its policy of liberal interpreta-
tion of Rule 10b-5, the Court, when finally faced with the question,
is unlikely to uphold the Birnbaum doctrine. 5' If the purchaser-
seller requirement is abandoned, the courts then must decide what
criterion to use in its place. They can, like the district courts in
Tully and Young, permit recovery by anyone who can prove dam-
ages and causation, or they can impose a further limitation on the
class of possible plaintiffs, such as that adopted by the instant
court. Although the court states that it refuses to formulate a suc-
cinct substitute for Birnbaum and prefers to permit the process of
case-by-case adjudication to define the limits of 10b-5 liability,52 the
court in effect has defined the class of plaintiffs with standing as
"persons who, in their capacity as investors, suffer significant injury
as a direct consequence of fraud. 5 3 Thus, the instant case seems to
represent a middle ground between Birnbaum and the elimination
of all 10b-5 standing requirements. This fact may make it more
acceptable to those courts that fear a detrimental effect on the
securities markets from expanded potential liability. Yet if the in-
stant characterization is to be used as the criterion for standing to
sue, it raises two questions: who is an "investor," and what is a
"direct consequence"? The court's analysis of the facts in the in-
stant case indicates that stockholders in a corporation that buys or
sells securities qualify as investors. In many cases in which the
Birnbaum rule is applied, plaintiffs are stockholders whose stock
has lost value through fraud in a securities transaction by the corpo-
ration. If such injury is construed as a direct consequence of the
fraud, the instant decision suggests that they will be able to sue in
their individual capacities as well as derivatively. Another type of
51. The ALI neither codifies nor rejects the Birnbaum doctrine in the proposed Federal
Securities Code, but rather leaves the area to the courts for further development. In § 1423,
it permits a court to recognize civil liabilities beyond those specified in the code if, among
other things, the prohibition which has been violated "is intended to protect a class of persons
to which the plaintiff belongs against the kind of harm alleged." ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE
§ 1423, Comment (5) at 186 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). It thus seems to authorize the ap-
proach taken by the instant court.
52. 490 F.2d at 660 n.29.
53. 490 F.2d at 659.
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factual situation in which the instant court's analysis can make a
significant difference is that of a plaintiff who fraudulently is dis-
suaded from selling securities. While under Birnbaum his right to
recover depends on whether he later sold the securities at a loss, he
seems to have been injured as a direct consequence of the fraud and
in his capacity as an investor. Since his investment decision has
been distorted by fraud, he should be within the class the Rule was
intended to protect, and should have standing to sue under the logic
of the instant decision. 4 A similar analysis can be made for a plain-
tiff who intended to buy but fraudulently was induced not to pur-
chase. The two cases differ, however, since the class of potential
sellers is limited to shareholders, while the class of potential buyers
is unlimited." Theoretically, in the case of a security traded on a
national exchange, anyone could allege that he would have bought
had he not read a misleading press release, for example. Fear of this
type of suit may be a justifiably significant factor in the courts'
reluctance to discard the Birnbaum rule; yet the instant court's
criteria for standing to sue do not appear to solve this problem.
Nevertheless, the court seems justified in relying on the general law
of damages to eliminate such suits because few such plaintiffs will
have proof that they would actually have bought. Since the stan-
dard to be used in place of the Birnbaum rule is not entirely clear
from the instant case, it is also possible that a case-by-case develop-
ment may result in a much broader or narrower class of plaintiffs.
If the issue is expressed as whether the specific plaintiff in each case
is within the class protected by the Rule, and the two-part criterion
stated in the instant case is not applied, the results are much less
predictable, since the standard in effect will depend on each court's
version of the policy of the Rule. Such a flexible standard will per-
mit courts to respond to the equities of individual cases but is likely
to create inconsistent results. A lack of clarity in the substantive
criteria of a 10b-5 violation would be unfair to potential defendants
attempting to plan their conduct and therefore jurisprudentially
suspect. Uncertainty in the standing rule, however, is unfair only if
it is assumed that a potential defendant is entitled to weigh the
penalty in planning an illegal act. Surely this is an assumption that
54. The proposed Federal Securities Code recognizes a deceptive act inducing someone
to hold, as well as to sell, a security as a violation of the securities laws, but leaves the
question of a private right to sue to the discretion of the courts. ALI FED. SECURMTES CODE
§ 1301, Comment (2)(b) at 33, § 1402, Comment (3) at 79 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
55. The proposed Federal Securities Code differentiates between fraud inducing one to
hold a security and fraud inducing one not to buy, recognizing the former as a violation
without mentioning the latter. See note 54 supra.
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few courts would be disposed to make. Thus, fairness to potential
defendants is not a compelling argument for adherence to the rigid
certainty of the Birnbaum rule. Despite the uncertainty in its stan-
dard and the likelihood that it will produce a further expansion of
10b-5 liability, the standing rule adopted by the instant court is still
preferable to the present purchaser-seller requirement and its nu-
merous exceptions.
Securities Regulation-Stock Exchanges-Good
Faith Discretionary Action by a Stock Exchange
to Rescue a Broker-Dealer Is a Defense to an Ac-
tion for Nonenforcement of Stock Exchange Rules
Under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
Plaintiff brought suit' against defendant, New York Stock Ex-
change, 2 a registered national securities exchange, for a loss suffered
when his securities were liquidated pursuant to a subordination
agreement; 3 he alleged violation of section 61 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 5 claiming that the failure to suspend the broker-
1. Plaintiff sought $1,400,000 in compensatory damages, $250,000 in punitive damages
and interest at the rate of 7%.
2. Plaintiff also brought suit against the broker-dealer, Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc.,
and 2 of its executives.
3. Under the terms of the subordination agreement, plaintiff transferred $1,271,600
worth of securities to the broker-dealer's capital account. The transfer had the effect of
subjecting the securities to possible claims of creditors. In return, plaintiff was paid interest
on the value of his securities at the rate of one-half of 1% above the prime rate and was
allowed to continue receiving all interest, dividends, and distributions on the securities.
4. Section 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970) states:
No registration shall be granted or remain in force unless the rules of the exchange
include provision for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member for conduct
or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade, and declare that
the willful violation of any provisions of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder
shall be considered conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles
of trade.
Section 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1970) states:
If it appears to the Commission that the exchange applying for registration is so
organized as to be able to comply with the provisions of this title and the rules and
regulations thereunder and that the rules of the exchange are just and adequate to insure
fair dealing and to protect investors, the Commission shall cause such exchange to be
registered as a national securities exchange.
5. The plaintiff also sought recovery against the Exchange for violation of 1) the anti-
fraud provisions of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970); § 12(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970); and § 17 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
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dealer with whom he had placed his securities was a breach of the
Exchange's duty to enforce its rules. The broker-dealer had experi-
enced extreme financial difficulty, had violated Exchange rules per-
taining to net capital requirements6 and the maintenance of ade-
quate books and records, 7 and was unable to comply fully with an
Exchange order to centralize its operations and reorder its account-
ing system. The Exchange did not suspend the broker-dealer, but
sanctioned its management,8 restricted its operations,9 and made a
discretionary interpretation of its net capital rule"° to give the
broker-dealer capital credit for unregistered stock. The firm later
experienced further net capital deficiencies and the Exchange en-
couraged and approved the subordination agreement between plain-
tiff and the broker-dealer." Shortly thereafter, a general market
decline forced both the sale of plaintiff's securities pursuant to the
agreement and the liquidation of the broker-dealer. 2 Plaintiff con-
tended that the Exchange, in not suspending the broker-dealer, had
failed to enforce its rules 3 and thereby violated section 6 of the 1934
§ 77q (1970), 2) the duty of a "controlling person" under § 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77o (1970) and § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970), 3) the
general duty of a fiduciary at common law, and 4) the general tort-law duty, the breach of
which makes one an aider and abettor to a principal tortfeasor at common law.
6. N.Y.S.E. Rule 325 establishes net capital requirements for Exchange members which
require that "[nmo member . . . shall permit, in the ordinary course of business as a broker,
. . . its Aggregate Indebtedness to exceed 2000 per centum of. . . its Net Capital. .. ."
CCH NYSE GUIDE V 2325, at 3525. The purpose of the rule is to prevent brokers from
continuing operations unless they have the requisite cash or liquid assets in the required ratio
to liquid assets.
7. N.Y.S.E. Rules 342 and 440 require the exercise of appropriate supervisory control
and the maintenance of adequate books and records so as to insure a source of information
fairly reflecting the financial and operational status of the firm for customers, investors and
the general public. CCH NYSE GUIDE T 2342, 2440, at 3585, 3781.
8. The firm was fined $100,000, its president $50,000, and a senior vice-president $5,000.
9. The Exchange prohibited the broker-dealer from advertising and adding registered
representatives. It also limited the maximum number of weekly trades and required an
immediate infusion of new capital.
10. See rule cited note 6 supra.
11. In addition to the subordination agreement with plaintiff, the broker-dealer ob-
tained an additional $7,000,000 subordinated loan from another individual secured by King
Resources stock having a value of $10,000,000. Even giving capital credit for these securities,
however, the broker-dealer still had a net capital deficiency of $10,241,000 on March 24,
1970-the date on which plaintiff subordinated his securites.
12. By July 1970 the value of the shares of King Resources had dropped from $23 per
share to $1.50 per share. This decline coupled with a general market decline was disastrous
for the broker-dealer in that it not only reduced the value of its net capital position but also
inhibited its ability to obtain new financing as well as to maintain existing financing. More-
over, there was a general decline in trading volume that aggravated the broker's financial
difficulties.
13. N.Y.S.E Rule 345 provides that disciplinary proceedings may be taken against
member firms who violate Exchange rules. CCH NYSE GUIDE 2345, at 3590-91. N.Y.S.E.
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Act. Defendant, pointing to plaintiff's knowledge of both the risks
involved and the broker-dealer's chances for recovery at the time he
entered into the agreement, argued that its own actions amounted
to a good faith attempt to rescue the broker-dealer from financial
collapse in order to protect the broker-dealer's creditors and to pre-
vent a general market loss of confidence that would adversely affect
other firms within the Exchange's responsibility. It therefore main-
tained that the actions taken were within its discretion and did not
constitute a breach of its duty under section 6. The United States
District Court for the Central District of California, held, judgment
for defendant. Action short of suspension taken by a registered na-
tional securities exchange as part of a good faith effort to rescue a
broker-dealer from extreme financial difficulty and to prevent a
general market loss of confidence is within the discretion of the
exchange and does not constitute a violation of its rule-enforcement
duty under section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Hughes
v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc., - F. Supp. -, CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,133, at 94,525 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1973).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the registration
of all national securities exchanges.14 Section 6 of the Act provides
that an exchange may register by filing with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) a registration statement containing
an agreement to comply with and to enforce its members' compli-
CONST. art. XIII, § 2 provides that whenever it should appear to the Exchange that a member
"has failed to meet his engagements or is insolvent, or . . . in such financial or operating
condition that he cannot be permitted to continue in business with safety to his creditors...
such member shall thereby become suspended from membership . O... CCH NYSE GUIDE
1602, at 1084. N.Y.S.E. CONST. art. XIV, § 6 provides that after determining that a mem-
ber was in violation of the Exchange constitution or of any rule promulgated thereunder, or
that a member has engaged in conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade, the Exchange may suspend that member. CCH NYSE GUIDE 1656, at 1086. N.Y.S.E.
CONST. art XIV, § 14 provides for disciplinary proceedings against member firms in instances
of violative conduct except that such proceedings are not required when a member has
entered into a consent penalty with the Exchange. CCH NYSE GUIDE 1664, at 1088-89.
N.Y.S.E. CONST. art. XIV, § 13 allows the Exchange to "remit or reduce" penalties, "[i]n
any proceeding in which the Board of Governors may impose the penalty of suspension or
expulsion .... " CCH NYSE GUIDE 1663, at 1087-88. From the above rules it is not clear
whether either mandatory suspension under Article XIII, § 2 or discretionary suspension
under Article XIV, § 6 was appropriate in the instant case in light of Article XIV, § 14, which
suspends the requirement of disciplinary proceedings once consent penalties have been en-
tered into. At least one writer, however, has said that Articles XIII, § 2 and XIV, § 6
mandate preliminary enforcement procedures that must be followed for the Exchange to be
acting within the boundaries of its permitted discretion. Further, it is argued that the Ex-
change's ability to remit or reduce penalties can not be invoked until such procedures have
been followed and suspension initially imposed. See Note, Exchange Liability for Net Capital
Enforcement, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1262, 1284-85 (1973).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970).
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ance with the provisions of the 1934 Act and any rule or regulation
made thereunder.' 5 Section 6(b) states that registration shall not be
granted unless the rules of an exchange provide for the expulsion,
suspension, or discipline of a member for conduct inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade." Section 6(d) empowers the
SEC to register an exchange upon a finding that the exchange's
organization enables it to comply with the provisions of the 1934 Act
and the rules and regulations thereunder and that the rules of the
exchange are just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect
customers. 7 While no express private right of action is granted
under section 6, the courts have construed it to grant an implied
private right of action against an exchange for failure to enforce its
rules. The Second Circuit, in the 1944 case of Baird v. Franklin,5
first granted this private right of action when the New York Stock
Exchange was sued for failure to enforce its rules and to take disci-
plinary action against a member who the Exchange had reason to
believe had converted plaintiff's securities. The majority found that
the 1934 Act placed a broad duty upon an exchange 9 to enforce its
rules, to investigate the dealings and financial conditions of its
members, and to suspend or expel members who it had reason to
believe had been guilty of conduct inconsistent with just and equita-
ble principles of trade. The rationale behind this duty is expressed
in Judge Clark's separate opinion.2" He reasoned that the Exchange
rules required under section 6(b) must be read together with the
purposes expressed in section 6(d) of insuring fair dealing and pro-
tecting investors.2' These purposes could be realized only if section
6(b) were construed to impose the twofold duty upon an exchange
of both enacting and enforcing its rules.2 He then stated that a
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970). See text of statute cited note 4 supra.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1970). See text of statute cited note 4 supra.
18. 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
19. The majority in summary fashion adopted the view developed in Judge Clark's
dissenting opinion that § 6 imposed a duty upon an exchange to enforce its rules in stating:
We accede to the view that the Stock Exchange violated a duty when it failed to take
disciplinary action against Richard Whitney on November 24, 1937, after there was
reason to believe that the latter had converted plaintiffs' securities.
141 F.2d at 239.
20. 141 F.2d 238, 240. While Judge Clark concurred with the majority as to the Ex-
change's duty to enforce its rules, he dissented from the majority's conclusion that because
the duty to enforce the rules arose after the loss had taken place, there was no causal
connection between the violation of that duty and the plaintiff's loss, and the Exchange could
therefore not be held liable.
21. 141 F.2d at 244.
22. Id.
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private right of action was required to effectuate the 1934 Act's
underlying policies of complete and effective protection of the gen-
eral investing public.23 Since the Baird decision, only a few cases
have considered the question of exchange liability under section 6.
In Pettit v. American Stock Exchange,2 a 1963 decision, the court,
in denying the Exchange's motion to dismiss, rejected its argument
that section 6 liability arose only when it had knowledge of member
rule violations and held that the Baird rationale applied also to
negligent violations of section 6. Four years later, however, the Sev-
enth Circuit, in Butterman v. Walston & Co.? limited Pettit to
situations involving a general deficiency of control"0 by an exchange
and held that an exchange had no duty to supervise or review a
member's activities; therefore an exchange could not be held liable
under section 6 for failure to enforce its rules unless it had knowl-
edge or reason to know of alleged violations by members." In a 1971
declaratory judgment action, Bright v. Philadelphia-Baltimore-
Washington Stock Exchange,8 liability was found under section 6
for the Exchange's violation of one of its constitutional provisions
pertaining to the election of governors. The court noted that while
the provision was not promulgated under section 6(b), section
6(a) (3)25 requires an exchange to file with the SEC a copy of its rules
which are also subject to SEC scrutiny under section 6(d). The court
reasoned that if rule enforcement is left to the whim of an exchange
23. Id. at 244-45. Judge Clark elaborated on this rationale as follows:
If § 6(b) here were to be construed as granting no right of action to plaintiffs, the avowed
purpose of 'reasonably complete and effective' protection would indeed be a snare and
a delusion.
The fact that the statute provides no machinery or procedure by which the individ-
ual right of action can proceed is immaterial. It is well established that members of a
class for whose protection a statutory duty is created may sue for injuries resulting from
its breach and that the common law will supply a remedy if the statute gives none.
Id. at 245.
24. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
25. 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968) (the court affirmed a
summary judgement in favor of the New York Stock Exchange).
26. The Exchange was held not to be responsible without knowledge of rule violations
involving individual members' isolated transactions, the supervision of which would be im-
possible due to the large volume of such transactions. The Exchange, however, was still
charged with the responsibility of exercising due care to insure the general compliance of its
members with its rules. See Allen, Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act for Violations
of Stock Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. LAw. 1493, 1495 (1970).
27. Section 6 has also been used to hold an exchange member liable for violation of
stock exchange rules. E.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d
135 (7th Cir.), cert.'denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) (violation of N.Y.S.E. Rule 405 ("know your
customer" rule)).
28. 327 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3) (1970).
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there would have been no purpose for its inclusion with the other
rules that are subject to review under the 1934 Act. It concluded
that an exchange has a duty to enforce rules applicable to its inter-
nal organization as well as rules dealing with member discipline, the
subject of the litigation in the earlier cases .3 An approach different
from the implied statutory private right of action found in Baird was
used in Weinberger v. New York Stock Exchange.3' In that case,
since plaintiff's remedy under Baird was barred by a three-year
statute of limitations applicable to causes of action created by stat-
ute,12 he alleged that an investor is a third party beneficiary of the
Exchange's section 6 agreement with the SEC. The court denied the
Exchange's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the congressional in-
tent found in Baird to provide a remedy for exchange dereliction of
duty made an investor more than an incidental beneficiary. While
all of the foregoing cases continually reaffirmed an exchange's duty
to enforce its rules under section 6, no case has ever given judgment
against an exchange based on such a theory. 3 Moreover, the prob-
lem of establishing limits within which an exchange, by virtue of its
self-regulatory nature, can exercise discretion in carrying out its
section 6 duties has not been previously addressed. The question of
exchange discretion in general was discussed in an antitrust action,
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,34 in which the Supreme Court
held that the Exchange had exceeded the scope of its regulatory
authority by depriving non-member broker-dealers of direct wire
connections with member firms. The Court took the opportunity to
expound upon the extent to which the discretionary nature of ex-
change self-regulation precluded other causes of action against an
exchange and to point out the role of exchange rules in effectuating
the policies of the 1934 Act. While it noted that one of the Act's
purposes was to make an exchange a self-regulatory body,35 its du-
ties of self-regulation were not found to be incompatible with the
maintenance of an antitrust action.36 It also pointed out that it
regarded the Exchange rules promulgated under section 6 as part
:30. 327 F. Supp. at 502.
31. 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
32. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (McKinney 1963). The third party beneficiary theory was
necessary to bring plaintiff within a six year statute of limitations applicable to contractual
obligations. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (McKinney 1963).
:33. See Note, Exchange Liability for Net Capital Enforcement, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1262,
1274 (1973).
34. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
35. Id. at 352-53.
36. Id. at 358-59.
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of the fulfillment of its duties under the 1934 Act.37 Citing this
purpose of making the exchange a self-regulatory body recognized
in Silver, 3 the Fifth Circuit, in Intercontinental Industries v. Ameri-
can Stock Exchange,39 held that an exchange should be accorded
broad discretion in the determination of the meaning and applica-
tion of its rules. The court upheld an SEC finding that the Exchange
had correctly interpreted its own rule that permitted delisting of a
company's securities for its non-compliance with Exchange disclo-
sure requirements. Taking into account the presence of SEC in-
volvement in Intercontinental, that case cannot be said to have
dealt with the nature and extent to which an exchange, without
SEC approval, could exercise discretion in carrying out its section
6 duties.
The instant court first recognized that section 6 grants broad
regulatory powers to a national securities exchange and that there
is concomitant discretion in carrying out that authority. Nonethe-
less, an exchange's agreement to enforce rule compliance of member
firms under the 1934 Act and the section 6(b) requirement that an
exchange's rules provide for the expulsion, suspension, or discipline
of a member for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable princi-
ples of trade were found to indicate that regulation by an exchange
is not absolutely discretionary. The court distinguished the broad
discretionary approach in Intercontinental as being applicable only
when an exchange is applying one of its rules with the approval of
the SEC, while the instant case involved the alleged failure to apply
a rule with no such approval. Citing Baird, Bright, and Weinberger,
the court stated that a cause of action does lie against an exchange
for violation of its section 6 duties to enforce its rules. Moreover, the
court found the Supreme Court's Silver holding-that the self-
regulatory nature of an exchange's duties does not preclude an anti-
trust action-equally applicable in the context of a securities fraud
action. The court then turned to the issue of whether the Exchange
had abused its discretion by not suspending the broker-dealer. It
37. The Court stated:
In light of the important role of exchanges in our economy and the 1934 Act's design of
giving the exchanges a major part in curbing abuses by obligating them to regulate
themselves, it appears conclusively . . . that the rules applied in the present case are
germane to the performance of the duty, implied by § 6(b) and § 6(d), to have rules
governing members' transactions and relationships with non-members.
Id. at 356. See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM.
L. RF.v. 12, 20-21 (1966).
38. 373 U.S. 341, 352-53 (1963).
39. 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971).
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noted that the Exchange's discretionary applications of its rules and
approval of the subordination agreement were designed to rescue
the broker-dealer from financial collapse, in order to protect its
creditors and to prevent a general market loss of confidence, which
would adversely affect other firms within the Exchange's responsi-
bility. 0 With these goals in mind, the court reasoned that to hold
the Exchange liable would place it in the impossible position of
making an ultimate choice between submitting to a form of strict
liability for the potential risks inherent in similar rescue schemes or
foregoing equally important legal and ethical obligations to other
members of its national organization and their clients. This choice,
the court concluded, would eliminate the fundamental flexibility
and discretion necessary for the effective functioning of a national
securities exchange.4 Having found that the Exchange's actions
were a good faith exercise of its discretion, the court held that the
Exchange had not breached its duty to enforce its rules under sec-
tion 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.42
The instant decision represents a significant development in
the law of stock-exchange liability.13 While Baird and its progeny
continually have reaffirmed and expanded the availability of a pri-
vate right of action for failure to enforce stock exchange rules, this
is the first case to hold that a good faith exercise of discretion by
an exchange in enforcing its rules will exempt it from such liability.
The statutory framework is broad in scope. First, section 6(b) of the
1934 Act is phrased only in general terms; it requires that exchange
rules provide for the expulsion, suspension, or discipline of a mem-
40. The loss of confidence in the brokerage industry by the demise of the broker-dealer
in the instant case was viewed as a potential cause of investor withdrawal from the securities
markets-an effect that in turn would aggravate precarious financial positions of other mem-
ber firms.
41. The court also noted that Congress has recognized the dilemma thrust upon an
exchange by such a situation and has provided a method whereby it could be avoided. The
court pointed out that by enacting the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aaa et seq., Congress has provided a statutory scheme whereby such crises can be antici-
pated, dealt with, and resolved on a fair and equitable basis. This is accomplished largely
by giving the Securities and Exchange Commission broad powers to take affirmative action
with respect to the conditions that might result in the financial crisis involved in the instant
situation after it has been given notice of such conditions. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,133,
at 94,546-47 n. 29. See Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: A New Federal
Role in Investor Protection, 24 VAND. L. REv. 586 (1971).
42. The court also found that the Exchange was not liable on plaintiff's other alleged
causes of action. See note 5 supra.
43. The decision's precedential value is especially important since the liquidity crunch
of 1969-1970 has engendered approximately 25 suits against registered national securities




ber for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade.44 Secondly, the rules promulgated by the Exchange and found
by the SEC to be in compliance with section 6 are also very broadly
stated. They require suspension only upon a finding by the Ex-
change of certain specific conditions,45 and the Exchange can still
"remit or reduce" a penalty of suspension or expulsion:46 It is thus
apparent that some exercise of discretion by the Exchange is re-
quired. In spite of the rules' lack of specific guidelines concerning
its exercise, however, Baird and subsequent cases did not consider
the breadth of permissible exchange discretion. This omission may
explain in part the fact that Baird and its progeny have uniformly
refused to hold an exchange liable for nonenforcement of rules al-
though expressly recognizing such a cause of action. 7 The instant
decision, by addressing the question of exchange discretion in rule
enforcement, has provided a new framework under which an ex-
change's section 6 liability can be determined. In using their newly
formulated approach, the court viewed the Exchange's failure to
suspend the broker-dealer in light of the Exchange's concurrent
obligations to the creditors of the broker-dealer, to its other mem-
bers, and to the investing public. While a strict reading of the Ex-
change rules might mandate suspension," thus making the Ex-
change liable in light of the Baird rationale, the discretionary as-
pects of both section 6 and the Exchange rules provide a defense
when an exchange acts in good faith to carry out all of its obliga-
tions. " In refusing to force the Exchange to choose between the
interests of a single firm and its creditors and those of the remaining
member firms and their creditors, the court's decision is both logical
and consistent with the multiple responsibilities placed upon an
exchange by the 1934 Act. As the court points out, Congress, after
the accrual of plaintiff's cause of action, recognized this dilemma
and provided a method to avoid such crises in the future through
enactment of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.1 The
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b). See text of statute cited note 4 supra.
45. N.Y.S.E. CONST. art. XIII, § 2, cited note 13 supra.
46. N.Y.S.E. CONST. art. XIV, § 13, cited note 13 supra.
47. See Note, Exchange Liability for Net Capital Enforcement, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1262,
1274 (1973).
48. See rules cited note 13 supra.
49. While it might be thought that the reasoning of the instant decision would be
equally applicable in the context of an antitrust action, it should be noted that the majority
in Silver did not take the view set forth in Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion that good faith
action by an exchange to effectuate its statutory duty of self-regulation would exclude it from
antitrust liability. 373 U.S. at 371.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa et seq. (1970). See note 41 supra.
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Act requires that either the SEC or the appropriate "self-regulatory
body" notify the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(S.I.P.C.) of any member firm experiencing financial difficulty.',
The S.I.P.C. may apply for a district court decree adjudicating the
member firm in need of protection under the Act, and the court is
empowered to undertake a variety of measures upon such a find-
ing. 5 2 Subordinated lenders such as the plaintiff in the instant case
are excluded from the Act's protection. 3 As the court noted, how-
ever, the Investor Protection Act would have the effect of creating
a higher profile of the risks involved in becoming a subordinated
lender since the same circumstances that would lead a broker-dealer
to seek a subordination agreement would also probably require the
initiation of liquidation proceedings under the Act, thus putting a
potential subordinated lender on notice of those risks." Nonethe-
less, at the time of accrual of plaintiff's cause of action, this statute
was not in force, and the Exchange had a more pervasive regulatory
role in dealing with financially distressed members. Performance of
this type of role requires considerable flexibility if an exchange is
to function viably under such unusual conditions of economic dis-
tress, and the instant decision effectively combines the Baird
rationale with the discretionary elements of the 1934 Act and the
Exchange rules in this context. Moreover, the logic of the instant
decision does not appear to be limited only to situations where an
exchange makes discretionary rule applications regarding finan-
cially distressed members. The good faith defense seems equally
applicable in all instances of discretionary exchange rule applica-
tions. Such an extension of the instant case, however, necessarily
would put an exchange composed of broker-dealers in a position to
make policy decisions affecting not only themselves, but also their
creditors and the investing public. The weilding of large amounts
of broad discretionary power by this type of body may be inappro-
priate, especially in times of an economic crisis. To remedy this
situation, increased involvement of the SEC would seem to be a
better method of balancing the competing interests. In the finan-
cially distressed broker situation, the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970 has specifically empowered the SEC to take certain
remedial steps, which include the alteration of exchange rules and
regulations, the ability to require reports on the financial condition
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(1) (1970).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff, ggg, iii (1970).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1970).
54. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,133, at 94,547 n. 29.
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of members, and the power to inspect any exchange or member
thereof with respect to its financial condition.5 Similarly, in other
situations, if an exchange could engage in discretionary rule enforce-
ment only with SEC approval, less chance would exist for unfairness
and abuse of discretion. This approach would be consistent with the
Fifth Circuit's Intercontinental Industries holding that'it is proper
to accord broad discretion to an exchange in the determination of
the meaning and application of its rules when the SEC previously
has given its approval. An additional solution might be to require
the Exchange to revise its rules to clarify the limits of discretion in
rule application. In this regard, Professor Davis, while recognizing
that significant discretionary power is necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the main objectives of modern government, has stated that
not only should unnecessary discretionary power be eliminated, but
necessary discretionary power should be properly confined, struc-
tured and checked. 6 He has further stated that administrative stan-
dards and safeguards provide a highly significant method for protec-
tion against the arbitrary exercise of discretionary power.57 This
logic is equally applicable in the context of a private self-regulatory
body and the above mentioned revisions of the Exchange's rules
would eliminate the current high degree of uncertainty concerning
the extent of permissible rule-enforcement discretion created by the
general wording of the Exchange rules. Further, in revising its rules
the Exchange could indicate those interests that in its opinion must
be evaluated in its discretionary exercise of the rule-enforcement
duty. These guidelines could serve as a useful tool to the courts, the
public, and the Exchange itself in assessing the propriety of an
actual or proposed discretionary rule application in light of the
policies of both the 1934 Act and the Exchange rules.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78iii(f) (1970).
56. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.03 (1972).
57. Id. § 6.05. Davis advocates that the courts should require administrative rulemak-
ing to limit discretion:
IBloth federal and state courts should . . . move from statutory standards to adminis-
trative standards and administrative safeguards, and then. . . to the totality of protec-
tions against arbitrariness. The courts should develop a requirement that as far as
practicable administrators must structure their discretionary power through appropriate
safeguards and must confine and guide their discretionary power through standards,
principles, and rules.
Id. § 2.10 at 52. (emphasis in original). See Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus,
439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (court required the Secretary of Agriculture to state reasons





162(a)(3) Deduction Allowed for Rent Payments
Made by Reversioner Under Gift-to-Trust and
Leaseback of Business Property
Taxpayers, husband and wife, created separate irrevocable
trusts for the benefit of each of their four minor children by transfer-
ring equal undivided interests in their funeral-home building to
their attorney as trustee. The trust instruments provided that after
a term of ten years and one day the corpora of the trusts were to
revert to taxpayers or their estates.' Taxpayers, 2 by prearrangment,
leased the funeral home from the trustee for a fifteen-month period
shortly after executing the trust instruments. The initial lease was
followed by a new one-year lease that afforded taxpayers an option
to renew annually upon terms mutually agreeable to the parties. 3
During the years in question 1964-66, taxpayers deducted the rent
payments' as ordinary and necessary business expenses under sec-
tion 162(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 5 The Commissioner
disallowed the deductions on the ground that taxpayers' reversion-
ary interest was a disqualifying "equity" in the rental property. On
petition to the Tax Court, held, a reversionary interest not derived
from the lease or the lessor, which becomes possessory only after the
expiration of the lessor's term of years, is not a disqualifying "eq-
uity" under section 162(a)(3). C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. No. 3
(Oct. 3, 1973).
1. Fearing possible adverse tax consequences, and because the taxpayers later became
willing and able to relinquish their reversionary interests in the trust, taxpayers executed a
subsequent trust agreement in 1966, transferring their reversionary interests in the funeral
home property to a new irrevocable trust for the benefit of their four children.
2. The funeral home property actually was leased to the husband alone. However,
husband and wife filed joint federal income tax returns from which the deductions in issue
were taken, so the reference "taxpayers" seems appropriate.
3. Renewals of the one-year lease were in effect during the years in question.
4. Taxpayer paid $14,310, $14,040, and $14,040 as rent for the calendar years 1964, 1965,
and 1966 respectively.
5. All Internal Revenue Code references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Section 162(a)(3) provides:
(a) In General-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including-
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property
to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no
equity.
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A progressive income tax encourages the taxpayer with income
above his consumption level to attempt to shift the excess income
to other persons, frequently members of his family, in an effort to
incur a lower total amount of tax liability. The gift-to-trust and
leaseback device is commonly used by individuals engaged in pro-
fessional or service-oriented enterprises in attempting to shift their
income. This arrangement usually involves a transfer by gift6 of
some form of business property, for example an office building, to a
trust for the benefit of certain members of the grantor's family.
Thereafter, typically by prearrangement, the grantor and trustee
enter into an agreement whereby the trust property is leased back
to the grantor for a reasonable rent.7 The tax-planning objectives of
the gift-to-trust and leaseback are the inclusion of the rental
amount in the trusts' or beneficiaries' gross income and the deduc-
tion of that amount from the grantor's gross income.' To achieve
these objectives, the trust first must comply with the Clifford rules,9
now codified in sections 671-78 of the Internal Revenue Code,' 0
which set forth standards for determining whether the trust is the
"owner" of the trust corpus, which in turn governs whether the
income produced by the corpus is taxable to the trust and its benefi-
ciaries, or to the grantor." Under these standards, the trust is the
6. The grantor of a short-term trust is deemed to have made a gift of the present value
of the rental income of the property for federal gift tax purposes. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§
2511-12. As long as the income of the trust is required to be distributed periodically to the
beneficiaries, the gift is one of a present interest in property, and the grantor may take a
§ 2503(b) exclusion. In addition, the grantor may claim the § 2521 exemption and may
utilize the § 2513 split-gift treatment if he is married and if his spouse has consented to such
treatment. Thus, the gift tax incurred is likely to be minimal after the application of the
above sections to the present value of the income. See 1 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING (3d ed.
1961); Note, The Use of Business Property As Short-Term Trust Corpus, 19 VAND. L. REV.
811, 814 (1966).
7. For variants of this basic plan see Note, The Use of Business Property As Short-Term
Trust Corpus, 19 VAND. L. REv. 811, 813 (1966).
8. The tax savings of the gift-to-trust and leaseback arrangement is dependent upon,
first, the difference between the grantor's tax bracket and the trust's or beneficiaries' tax
brackets; secondly, the amount of gift tax incurred by the grantor; and thirdly, the amount
by which the rental deduction under § 162(a)(3) exceeds the depreciation deduction under
§ 167 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, assuming the asset is depreciable and has not
been fully depreciated. The attractiveness of the gift-to-trust and leaseback transfer would
seem especially great where the asset has been fully depreciated and no further deduction is
possible.
9. The rules derive their name from the Supreme Court decision of Helvering v. Clif-
ford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). The case set forth rules for the determination of the question
whether trust income was taxable to the grantor or to the trust (or trust beneficiaries) in a
short-term trust situation.
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78.
11. It is a well-known principle that income from property is taxed to the owner of that
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owner of the trust corpus if the following conditions are satisfied: no
reversionary interest in the grantor will take effect for ten years;' 2
certain prohibited powers over the disposition'3 or the administra-
tion'4 of the trust corpus or income are not retained by the grantor;
the trust is irrevocable;'5 and the corpus or income of the trust is not
used for the grantor's benefit.'6 It is improper to assume, however,
that simply because rental income is taxable to a trust under the
Clifford sections, such rental payments are deductible by a grantor
as business expenses under section 162(a)(3) .7 A grantor seeking to
deduct rental payments made to a short-term trust under a lease-
back agreement must establish that such payments come within the
ambit of section 162(a)(3) and that the gift-to-trust and leaseback
arrangement is valid according to judicially developed standards.
First allowed in 1916,' 8 section 162(a)(3) deductions are permitted
for all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during a
taxable year in carrying on a trade or business, including rentals or
other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued
use or possession of property to which the taxpayer has not taken
or is not taking title, and in which he has no "equity". The term
"equity", however, is not defined in the Code, and legislative history
is silent with respect to its intended meaning.'9 Scholars in the area
generally agree that the language was intended to close a loophole
whereby mortgagors were allowed business deductions for principal
payments on mortgage contracts.2 1 Skemp v. Commissioner' is the
earliest case that deals with intra-family shifting of income in the
property. A corollary to that principle is the assignment of income doctrine, which states that
income is taxed to the person who earns it, thus discouraging attempts to shift such earned
income.
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 673(a).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 674.
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 675.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 676.
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 677-78.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c) (1971). The regulation reads in part: "[t]hese sections
have no application in determining the right of a grantor to deductions for payments to a trust
under a transfer and leaseback arrangement."
18. Statutory language similar to § 162(a)(3) first appeared in Revenue Act of 1916,
§ 12(a)(lst), 39 Stat. 756, 767.
19. S. Rep. No. 793, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916); H.R. Rep. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1916), as cited in, Note, The Use of Business Property As Short-Term Trust Corpus,
19 VAND. L. REV. 811, 820 (1966). Neither report provides any clue to the purpose of the
adoption of the word "equity".
20. See, 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.108 (1972); Note, Tax
Treatment of the Lease With Option to Purchase: Is Allocation the Answer?, 11 TAX L. REV.
65 (1955).
21. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948), rev'g A.A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415 (1947).
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gift-to-trust and leaseback context. The controversy in Skemp cen-
tered around a twenty-year irrevocable trust created for the benefit
of a physician's wife and children. Taxpayer had transferred his
medical building to a trust, managed by an institutional trustee,
which leased it back to him for ten years at a reasonable rental with
an option to renew for another ten years. The trustee Ndas directed
to pay the rental income of the trust to the beneficiaries, and ulti-
mately to distribute the corpus to taxpayer's children.22 The Sev-
enth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's argument that, because
the grantor had voluntarily created the situation which required the
payment of rent, the rental deductions2 should be disallowed. In
allowing the deduction it reasoned that, unless a violation of the
fiduciary duty could be imputed to the trustee, the taxpayer had a
legal obligation to make rental payments as a condition to the con-
tinued use and possession of the property. 24 Similarly in Brown v.
Commissioner,25 the Third Circuit allowed rental deductions in a
gift-to-trust and leaseback situation in which the leaseback was
prearranged, the rental payments were reasonable, taxpayers' attor-
ney was named trustee, and the taxpayers did not retain a reversion-
ary interest in the trust corpus.2 1 It rejected the Tax Court's charac-
terization of the transaction as a mere gift of income, singling out
the independence of the trustee as a controlling factor. The indepen-
dent trustee was in the position to require the payment of rent; the
fact that he did require such payments, without regard to whether
the taxpayers' operations on the leased property resulted in taxable
income, made the payments properly deductible from gross income
by the taxpayers. Shortly thereafter, however, in White v.
Fitzpatrick,2 7 a taxpayer was denied a deduction for rental and roy-
alty payments made directly to his wife. The Second Circuit, feeling
that Skemp and Brown "go to the verge of the law," distinguished
them as involving independent trustees. 28 The taxpayer in White
22. The taxpayer retained no reversionary interest in the trust corpus.
23. The deductions were claimed under a predecessor of § 162(a)(3). INT. REV. CODE
OF 1939, § 23(a)(1)(A).
24. The court indicated that the agreement between the taxpayer-grantor and the trus-
tee was as binding as if the taxpayer had rented a place to practice medicine wholly apart
from the trust corpus.
25. 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950), rev'g Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 814 (1950).
26. The corpus of the trust was coal-producing property. There was no reversion in the
taxpayers-grantors under the trust instrument, but the period of the lease was estimated to
be long enough to exhaust the coal in the leased land, and the land was probably without
significant value once the coal was removed. Id. at 930 (Kolodner, J., dissenting).
27. 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952).
28. Id. at 401.
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had made a direct gift to his wife and entered into an oral leaseback.
The court found that the practical effect of the transaction was to
create a right to income in the wife, while leaving untouched the
taxpayer's effective dominion and control over the gift property.29
The first in the more recent line of cases" involving a gift of business
property to a short-term trust with a leaseback is Hall v. United
States .3 The Commissioner argued for the first time in Hall that the
taxpayers, because of their reversionary interest in the corpus of the
trust and their right to settle the account of the trustee, had re-
tained in the leased property an "equity" of the type which should
preclude a section 162(a)(3) deduction for rental payments. The
court, although it made no attempt to define the word "equity",
apparently accepted this proposition as an alternative basis for their
decision that the rental deductions were not allowable. The princi-
pal bases for the decision, however, were that the transaction lacked
a valid business purpose, which the court felt was required implic-
itly by section 162(a)(3), and that the trustee lacked the requisite
independence.12 The Commissioner once again advanced his conten-
tion that a reversionary interest in the taxpayer-grantor is a disqual-
ifying "equity" under section 162(a)(3) in Van Zandt v.
Commissioner.3 3 The Fifth Circuit, while denying the taxpayer a
rental deduction, emphasized the importance of a factual evalua-
tion of each particular case. The court stressed the taxpayer's dual
role as grantor and trustee in finding that the requirement of inde-
pendence was not satisfied. Viewing the transaction as an integrated
29. There was a strong dissent by Chase, Circuit Judge.
30. For a discussion of other early cases in the area see Oliver, Income Tax Aspects of
Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property in Trust, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 21 (1965).
31. 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962). Each of 3 doctors practicing as a partnership
owned, together with their respective wives, an undivided one-third interest in an office
building. A portion of the building was leased to other occupants, and the 3 doctors had their
offices in the remaining portion of the building. Each doctor and his wife transferred their
interest in the building to a corporate trustee, and 2 days later the partnership entered into
a leaseback for the space it occupied. The rental payments were reasonable. Each of the 3
trust instruments named the grantors' children as beneficiaries. Each trust was to last until
the death of a child of the grantors, or either of the grantors, at which time the corpus would
revert to the surviving grantor or pass under the will of the last surviving grantor. The
grantors reserved the power to revoke, amend, or modify the trust after 10 years.
32. The court apparently inferred the trustee's lack of independence from the fact that
the taxpayers-grantors had a reversionary interest and a right to settle the trustee's accounts,
which compromised his freedom of action.
33. 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965), affg I.L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824 (1963), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 814 (1965). The taxpayer, a physician, created 2 irrevocable short-term trusts whose
corpus was an office building and equipment he owned. The taxpayer named himself as
trustee, and executed a leaseback agreement with himself as an individual on the date of the
execution of the trust instrument. The taxpayer retained a reversion.
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whole, the court further found that the obligation to pay rent was
not an "ordinary and necessary" expense incident to the conduct of
the taxpayer's business under section 162(a)(3), but was designed
merely to effectuate his desire to shift his income for tax purposes.
Concluding that the transaction did not have a valid business pur-
pose, the court disallowed the rent deduction without addressing the
"equity" issue. A view contrasting with that of Van Zandt was
presented by the Tax Court in the same year in Alden B. Oakes.3"
The Tax Court held that when a taxpayer transfers business prop-
erty to a valid irrevocable trust over which he retains no control and
then leases it back, it is not necessary to inquire whether there was
a business purpose for the gift, for if there is a valid post-gift busi-
ness purpose for the lease, rental payments to the trust are deducti-
ble. In effect the Oakes approach applies the test of business pur-
pose only to the leaseback, while the Van Zandt approach applies
it to the whole transaction. The court in Oakes noted that the ab-
sence of a reversionary interest in the taxpayer and the independ-
ence of the trustee were important factors in its decision. In dicta
the court indicated that the retention of a reversionary interest by
the taxpayer would have constituted a prohibited "equity" in the
property, requiring denial of the rental deduction under section
162(a) (3).11 The court stated that "[i]n legal parlance one has an
'equity' in property when he has a right of redemption, a reversion-
ary interest, a right to specific performance, or in general any right
respecting property which traditionally would have been enforcea-
ble by means of an equitable remedy." 36 Although the court's con-
sideration of the meaning of "equity" was not necessary to the de-
termination of the issue in Oakes, its treatment was an indication
that the term is susceptible to very broad and literal interpretation.
More recently, a federal district court exhibited considerable uncer-
tainty as to the meaning of the term "equity" in Chace v. United
States.37 The taxpayer in Chace created a ten-year trust for the
benefit of his children with the corpus to revert to the taxpayer. The
34. 44 T.C. 524 (1965). Taxpayers, a physician and his wife, conveyed a jointly-owned
building to a corporate trustee. The trust was irrevocable, and its duration was 11 years after
which time the corpus would revert to the taxpayers. The taxpayers' children were the
beneficiaries of the trust. Two days after the trust instrument was executed the trustee
entered into a leaseback agreement with the physician. Prior to the taxable years in question,
the physician transferred his reversion to his wife so as to make her the sole owner of the
reversion.
35. 44 T.C. at 531.
36. Id.
37. 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970).
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leaseback of the office building, which constituted the trust corpus,
granted the taxpayer the right to renew the lease at the same annual
rental payments for a period of time that extended beyond the
length of the trust. The district court, relying on Van Zandt, held
that no business purpose was accomplished by the transaction and
therefore disallowed the section 162(a)(3) rental deduction. In addi-
tion, the court indicated that the taxpayer had a disqualifying "eq-
uity" interest in the property. Although the court was unclear on
this point, presumably the taxpayer's unqualified right to renew the
lease for a length of time in excess of the trust's duration, plus the
reversion in the taxpayer, constituted the forbidden "equity." The
most recent case in the gift-to-trust and leaseback area, Gibbons v.
United States,38 directly addressed the question whether a rever-
sionary interest in the taxpayer-grantor is a prohibited "equity"
under sections 162(a)(3). The court, without elaboration, held that
a reversionary interest in the trust corpus constitutes a prohibited
"equity" under section 162(a)(3), and consequently denied the tax-
payer a deduction for rental payments. Thus, while the precise im-
pact of the retention of a reversion by a taxpayer-grantor in a gift-
to-trust and leaseback situation has not been clear, previous author-
ity seemed to indicate that such a reversion would be treated as a
prohibited "equity" in the rental property under section 162(a)(3).
In the instant case, the Tax Court, through analysis of prior
decisions, determined that rental payments by a grantor to a trustee
in a gift-to-trust and leaseback situation are deductible under sec-
tion 162(a)(3) only if three basic requirements are satisfied. First,
the grantor must not retain substantially the same control over the
property that he had before transferring such property to a trust.
The use of an independent trustee will usually satisfy this require-
ment because of his fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries and
freedom from control of the grantor. Secondly, the leaseback agree-
ment should be reduced to writing39 and must require the payment
of a reasonable sum as rent. Lastly, the leaseback, as distinguished
from the gift of property to trust, must have a bona fide business
purpose. The court stated that such a purpose may be established
by demonstrating that the rental payments were both ordinary and
38. 70-1 U.S. TAx CAS. 83,347 (D.N.M. 1970). The taxpayer, a physician, created an
irrevocable short-term trust for the benefit of his 5 children. The taxpayer transferred his
office building to the trust and retained a reversionary interest. The leaseback entered into
by the taxpayer and trustee was for a period of 10 years, and the taxpayer was to pay monthly
rent.
39. But see Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972) (rental payments
deductible despite absence of written lease).
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necessary and were required to be paid as a condition to the contin-
ued use of the property. The court found the gift-to-trust and lease-
back transaction in question met these requirements. It then fo-
cused on the Commissioner's argument that a reversion scheduled
to become possessory upon the termination of a short-term trust
constitutes a disqualifying "equity" in the rental property under a
literal interpretation of section 162(a)(3). In analyzing the general
structure and purpose of section 162(a) (3) the court pointed out that
most of the cases considering the intended meaning of "equity" ask
whether a purported lease of property is in reality a sale; i.e., does
a portion of the supposed "rental" payments secure for the "lessee"
not merely the right to use and possession during the lease term, but
also an ownership interest, or "equity", in the leased property."
After acknowledging that such an application of section 162(a)(3)
is reasonable, the court rejected the argument that the disqualifying
"equity" contemplated by section 162(a)(3) includes a reversionary
interest owned by the lessee prior to the lease agreement. The court
felt the language of section 162(a)(3) belies such an interpretation
when read in its entirety, for the wording suggests that Congress
intended to prohibit deductions for rental payments under that sec-
tion only when the taxpayer "takes," not "has", title to the rental
property.' Reluctant to rely upon statutory construction, the court
based its holding primarily on the fact that the Commissioner's
interpretation of the language in question would produce such
anomalous and unfair tax results in the present context that Con-
gress could not have intended such a construction. For instance,
under the Commissioner's interpretation the owner of a reversion
subsequent to a 99-year lease would be precluded from deducting
bona fide rental payments pursuant to a ten-year sublease agree-
ment. The court also pointed out that the Commissioner's interpre-
tation of "equity" would seem to bar the owner of an undivided
interest in an asset from leasing the remaining interest from his co-
owner. Furthermore, the practical effect of the Commissioner's in-
terpretation would be the systematic overstatement of a lessee's net
40. The court stated that purported rental payments that are a disguised purchase price
of a "lessor's" property rights must be capitalized rather than deducted. E.g., Benton v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); M&W Gear Co., 54 T.C. 385 (1970), modified,
446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971); Earl L. Lester, 32 T.C. 711 (1959); Chicago Stoker Corp., 14
T.C. 441 (1950); Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948).
41. The court believed that Congress had in mind some on-going process in which the
taxpayer "takes" title to the "rental" property from the lessor through the purported rental
payments. The court found it difficult to read into the language of § 162(a)(3) a prohibition
on pre-existing ownership of property rights in the asset other than "those owned or purport-
edly owned by the lessor and subject to the lease."
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income for each year in which a part of the bona fide and necessary
cost of earning that income-rental payment-was disallowed as a
deduction. The court, consequently, concluded that the taxpayer's
reversionary interest was not a prohibited "equity" in the rental
property under section 162(a)(3) since it was not derived from the
lease or from the lessor and was scheduled to become possessor only
after the expiration of the short-term trust. The court stated that
to the extent the holding in Gibbons2 and the alternative holding
in Hall4 3 are inconsistent with its views, those decisions are rejected.
Finally, the court distinguished the instant case from the previous
Fifth Circuit decisions, particularly Van Zandt" and Chace,5 due
to the absence of an independent trustee in those cases.
The primary importance of the principal case is the court's
refusal to extend the "equity" proviso of section 162(a)(3) beyond
its traditional construction-a construction that simply precludes a
business expense deduction for payments made by a mortgagor"6 or
a long-term lessee with a purchase option" to acquire an ownership
interest in property, as distinguished from payments made merely
for the continued use and possession of such property. The Commis-
sioner's broad and literal construction of the "equity" phrase ig-
nores these traditional boundaries of section 162(a)(3)'s interpreta-
tion and application. 8 The payments under the leaseback agree-
ment in the instant case were strictly for the use of the property and
in no way added to the grantor-lessee's ownership interest therein.
Consequently, since the other criteria for deductibility were satis-
fied," such payments warranted deductions as legitimate business
expenses. Although the court narrowly addressed the issue whether
a reversionary interest was a disqualifying "equity" under section
42. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
43. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
44. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 20 & 40 supra and accompanying text.
47. See 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.109 (1972); Oliver,
Income Tax Aspects of Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property In Trust, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
21, 37 (1965). The underlying issue in the lease with the option to purchase cases was whether
the supposed rental payments were partially applied toward the cost of purchasing the prop-
erty, whereby the "lessor" would grant an option price on the rental property to the "lessee"
below the fair market value of the property.
48. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent in Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237,
249 (1955), commented, "[w]hile one should sail close to the shore of literalness in dealing
with the technical problems which are the subject matter of revenue laws, literalness of
meaning affixed merely to a particular word or phrase may itself distort what the provision
as an entity and in context conveys and therefore commands."
49. The Commissioner did not challenge the instant trust on any §§ 671-78 grounds.
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162(a)(3), a reasonable inference from the court's opinion is that
"equity" refers only to the acquisition of an equity or ownership
interest in the rental property by virtue of making the rental pay-
ments. Thus, an interest of the lessee-grantor's that does not arise
through the lease or from the lessor, and is limited to commence in
possession only after the expiration of the lessor's term of years, is
not a section 162(a) (3) "equity" interest. The instant court's deter-
mination that a reversion is not an "equity" interest is a step toward
the coordination of judicial standards governing rental deductions
in gift-to-trust and leaseback situations with the Clifford sections
of the Code. The trust in question was clearly within the permissible
standards of sections 671-78 and those sections clearly allow the
retention of a reversionary interest by the grantor. The primary
benefit of a Clifford trust is the opportunity it affords to temporarily
transfer capital assets and have the income that they produce taxed
to another. This benefit should be available equally to the individ-
ual who has accumulated investment property and the one who has
accumulated business property. For such an arrangement to benefit
the grantor of a trust whose corpus is business property, the income
of the trust-rental payments under the leaseback-must not only
be taxable to the trust, but must be deductible from the grantor's
gross income as business expenses in order to avoid double taxation.
To permit the grantor of a trust whose corpus is investment property
to enjoy the advantages of a Clifford trust while retaining a rever-
sion, and deny the same treatment to the grantor who establishes a
trust whose corpus is business property, is indefensible. The disal-
lowance of a rental deduction to the latter because of the mere
existence of a reversion is discriminatory against the taxpayer whose
wealth is in property used in his business as compared to the tax-
payer whose wealth is in investment property. Congress could not
have intended such a "distinction without a difference." Moreover,
the fundamental question is why legal ownership of a reversion in
business property should cause disallowance of an expense deduc-
tion when beneficial ownership and effective control over the prop-
erty have been transferred to another for a substantial period of
time. To achieve the same tax result taxpayer could have sold his
property to a third party, transferred the proceeds to a trust meeting
the requirements of sections 671-78, and leased the property from
the purchaser or leased new property; in either case the taxpayer
certainly would receive a section 162(a)(3) deduction for the rent
paid. There is no logical justification for forcing the taxpayer to
incur the inconvenience of contorted legal maneuverings to enjoy
the benefits of a Clifford trust. The tax planner, however, should be
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careful that a short-term trust in which business property consti-
tutes the corpus satisfies, first, the Clifford sections and regulations
of the Code to ensure that the income will be taxed to the trust or
the beneficiaries, and second, the three judicially created require-
ments identified by the instant court to have adequate grounds
upon which to deduct the rental payments from the grantor's gross
income. It is suggested that these statutory and judicially created
standards provide the Commissioner and the courts with sufficient
criteria for determining the legal status of a gift-to-trust and lease-
back; absent an "equity" in the form of an ownership interest in the
rental property derived through the lease or from the lessor, a sec-
tion 162(a)(3) deduction should be allowed.
Taxation-Corporate Redemptions-Absent a
Pre-Gift Agreement Obligating Taxpayer's Cor-
poration to Redeem Stock Donated by Taxpayer to
an Educational Institution, Post-Gift Redemp-
tions Do Not Constitute Constructive Dividends to
Taxpayer
Taxpayer, founder and majority stockholder of a closely-held
corporation,' challenged deficiencies assessed by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue based on the failure to report proceeds from the
redemption of the corporation's stock from an educational institu-
tion2 as personal income. Taxpayer had made charitable contribu-
tions:' of remainder interests in the stock4 to the educational institu-
tion and had retained a life income interest.5 Taxpayer maintained
1. Taxpayer also is vice president and a director of the corporation Grove, Shepard,
Wilson & Kruge, Inc., which is engaged primarily in the construction of airfields, highway
tunnels, and similar projects in the United States and abroad.
2. The educational institution, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), is a private, tax-
exempt educational institution. Taxpayer is an alumnus of RPI, having received his engineer-
ing degree there in 1924.
3. Annual gifts were made by taxpayer from 1954 to 1968 under a "life income funds"
plan, which provided that donor would receive any dividends and interest paid on securities
during his lifetime while any capital application would inure to RPI. Generally, RPI offered
donated shares to the corporation for redemption between one and 2 years after they were
donated by taxpayer.
4. Taxpayer limited his charitable contribution deduction under § 170 of the Code to
the value of the remainder interest received by RPI. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
5. Commissioner claimed deficiencies in taxpayer's taxable income for the years 1963
and 1964. Taxpayer had declared a taxable dividend of $4,939.28 and taxable interest of
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that since the gifts of stock were completed gifts when made, he did
not realize any income from the subsequent redemption. Although
at the time of the gifts the taxpayer and donee made no agreement
obligating the corporation to redeem the stock,6 the Commissioner
argued that the systematic nature of the gift-redemption cycle7 and
the degree of taxpayer's control over the transaction8 indicated a
mutual understanding pursuant to which the institution acted as a
tax-free conduit for withdrawing funds from the corporation.' The
Commissioner contended that the step-transaction doctrine' should
be applied because the donation was merely the first step in a prear-
ranged series of transactions; therefore, in substance, the redemp-
tion payments by the corporation were constructive dividend pay-
$2,535.75 in 1963 and $6,095.95 dividend and $3,540.81 interest in 1964 based on dividends
paid to him by RPI from reinvestments made with the redemptions' proceeds. The Commis-
sioner increased taxpayer's taxable income by $29,000 in 1963 and $25,000 in 1964-the
amounts paid by the corporation to RPI in the redemption of its stock-thereby increasing
taxpayer's taxes for each year by $13,000.
6. In a letter accompanying his initial donation, taxpayer made the gift subject to
certain qualifications, including the condition that the corporation could not be obligated to
redeem any of the donated shares. While the corporation was not obligated to redeem the
donated shares, under an agreement with the university, the corporation reserved the first
option to redeem the stock at book value.
7. Because of the nature of its business, which required the investment of large sums
of money over an extended period of time, the corporation was forced to maintain liquidity
by holding large amounts of cash or other current assets. To conserve its cash, the corporation
retained its earnings and refrained from paying cash dividends; therefore, in order to obtain
the maximum benefit from its gift, RPI successfully offered the shares for redemption and
invested the proceeds in more secure, income-producing property. Each offering by RPI
initially was authorized by the Finance Committee of the Board of Trustees. RPI's treasurer
then notified the president of the corporation, who would call a special meeting of the corpora-
tion's Board of Directors. The Board would adopt a resolution authorizing the redemption
and mail a company check to the treasurer. RPI then would return the appropriate stock
certificate to the corporation for cancellation.
8. Taxpayer conditioned his gift on RPI's agreement that if it disposed of any of the
donated shares, any proceeds would be invested and managed by an established professional
firm. In compliance with this agreement, RPI opened an investment account with Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane at the time of the first redemption. RPI authorized Merrill
Lynch to act directly upon the investment recommendations made by taxpayer's personal
investment advisor, who generally instructed that the redemption proceeds be invested in
securities of large corporations whose shares were traded on organized stock exchanges.
9. The Commissioner contended that taxpayer was able to achieve a bail-out from his
nondividend-paying close corporation because of his retention of a life income interest in the
reinvestment proceeds and of his retention of control over how those proceeds were reinvested.
10. The step-transaction doctrine has been defined in terms of its application in 4
situations. The doctrine has been applied by the ourts (1) to combine 2 or more steps into a
single transaction; (2) to characterize a single event as 2 or more significant tax transactions;
(3) to reorder the sequence of transactions; and (4) to determine the character of an event in
considering what steps actually constitute a transaction described by tax law. Hobbet, The
Step Transaction Doctrine and Its Effect on Corporate Transactions, 19th TuL. TAx INST. 102,
103-04 (1970).
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ments to the taxpayer followed by cash gifts to the institution."
Rejecting the Commissioner's contentions, the Tax Court" sus-
tained taxpayer's challenge by holding that the gifts to the educa-
tional institution were bona fide and that the redemptions of the
donated stock were independent transactions. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. In the ab-
sence of an agreement obligating taxpayer's corporation to redeem
stock donated by him to an educational institution, the gifts of stock
to the institution and the subsequent redemptions are independent
transactions and therefore fail to subject taxpayer to constructive
dividend treatment of the redemption proceeds. Grove v. Com-
missioner, 490 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1973).
Under the step-transaction doctrine, which often is applied in-
terchangeably with judicial examination of a transaction's sub-
stance as opposed to its form,' 3 the courts may refuse independent
treatment of the various steps in an integrated transaction and con-
sequently may regard the sum of the steps as a single transaction
for tax purposes.'4 Initially, the Commissioner invoked the doctrine
with consistent success, persuading the courts to ignore the form
adopted by the taxpayer and to examine the actualities of the trans-
action in determining tax liability.'5 This early successful applica-
tion of the doctrine was justified on the ground that its nonapplica-
tion would allow the taxpayer, not Congress, to determine the time
and manner of taxation.'" In the landmark case of Gregory v.
Helvering,7 in which the doctrine was applied because there was no
business purpose for each allegedly independent step in the transac-
tion, the Supreme Court acknowledged, however, that the taxpayer
11. By viewing the transaction as a series of interrelated steps, the Commissioner
argued that the redemption proceeds would be taxable as income to taxpayer. Moreover,
because taxpayer continued to control a majority of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
it is likely that the proceeds would be taxed as a dividend payment at progressive ordinary-
income rates rather than as a sale of shares at lower capital gains rates. See INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 302(a), (b).
12. Philip A. Grove, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 387 (1972).
13. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Weiss v. Steam, 265
U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
14. In a classic example of judicial application of the step-transaction doctrine, Gregory
v. Helvering, the Court combined the formation of a subsidiary, the transfer of securities to
it, a distribution of the stock to the subsidiary, and then the liquidation of the newly organ-
ized company into one transaction. As a single transaction, these events did not constitute a
reorganization as alleged but merely a distribution of securities. 293 U.S. 465 (1935), aff'g 69
F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). See Hobbet, supra note 10, at 103.
15. Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12th
INST. ON FED. TAX 247, 248 (1954). See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940).
16. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940).
17. 293 U.S. 476 (1935). See text of note 14 supra.
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had a legal right to minimize the amount of his taxes by legal
means;',8 accordingly, that the substance versus form argument may
be advanced by taxpayers as well as the Commissioner.'9 In apply-
ing the step-transaction doctrine, the courts have devised numerous
tests to determine whether a series of steps should be combined into
a single transaction. The test most frequently applied by the courts
has been the "mutual interdependency" test" under which the
courts have combined separate steps into a single transaction if "the
steps were so interdependent that the legal relations created by one
transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the
steps."2' Under the related "business-purpose" doctrine, if the tax-
payer has justified each step by an independent business purpose,
the courts have not regarded the particular steps as fruitless even
though the contemplated series of steps has not been completed.22
In addition to these two major tests, the courts also have considered
the intention of the parties, the period of time between the steps,
and the net effect of the steps in determining whether to combine
the steps into one transaction.Y While the application of the step-
transaction doctrine depends largely on the facts in a given case, the
courts must also consider the context of the tax statute in determin-
ing the doctrine's applicability.2" When a transaction described
under the Code incorporates many events,25 the courts have exer-
cised considerable latitude in deciding whether the several steps in
reality constitute a single integrated transaction. On the other
hand, when the transaction is described by the Code as a single
18. Writing for the lower court, Justice Hand summarized this view: "Any one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes." 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
19. See, e.g., Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961) ("Resort to
substance is not a right reserved for the Commissioner's exclusive benefit, to use or not to
use-depending on the amount of tax to be realized.").
20. R. PAUL & P. ZImFT, Step Transactions, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION
200, at 235-36 (2d ser. 1938) (hereinafter cited as PAUL & ZIMET).
21. Id. at 254. See, e.g., American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1938), aff'd mem.,
177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949).
22. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), aff'g 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934); H.B.
Zachry Co., 49 T.C. 73, 81-84 (1967). Tax avoidance is not regarded as a "business purpose"
under this test. Note, The Evolution of the Step Transaction Doctrine, 11 WASHBURN L.J. 84,
95 (1971).
23. Hobbet, supra note 10, at 108.
24. In certain sections of the Code, the step-transaction doctrine is incorporated into
the statute. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b)(2).
25. The most obvious sections are those dealing with corporate reorganizations. See
Hobbet, supra note 10, 123-41.
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event, 6 the courts have been reluctant to combine several steps into
one transaction for tax purposes.2 Although in the vast majority of
cases the courts' rationale for applying the step-transaction doctrine
has been clear, nevertheless, with respect to certain types of trans-
actions the courts have been unable to formulate a precise test or
rationale and have justified their application of the doctrine on the
general ground that substance must prevail over form. A pertinent
example of this judicial generalization occurred in Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co.,25 in which the Supreme Court implicitly applied
the doctrine 29 to reorder the sequence of taxable events, stating that
the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of the trans-
action and that the transaction must be viewed as a whole. The
Court Holding Co. case involved a post-liquidation sale of assets by
shareholder-distributees as a result of negotiations that were initi-
ated between the purchaser and the corporation before the liquida-
tion; the Court held that because the corporation had never disasso-
ciated itself from the negotiations, the sale should be treated as if
it had preceded the liquidation thereby resulting in income to the
corporation. The Court characterized the shareholder as a mere
conduit through which title was passed-a formalism that should
not cloud the transaction's true nature. Four years later, the Com-
missioner, relying on the Court's decision in Court Holding Co.,
sought to apply the substance versus form argument in United
States v. Cumberland Public Service Commission,3" a factually sim-
ilar case, but the Supreme Court distinguished Court Holding Co.
on the ground that a genuine dissolution occurred in Cumberland
before the sale. Therefore the carefully advised taxpayers were able
to structure their transaction to avoid the Court Holding Co.
result.-' Recognizing that the Court's two decisions created a trap
for unwary taxpayers by emphasizing the transaction's form, Con-
gress enacted section 337 which divorced "the tax consequences of
the liquidation-sale combination from the form of the transac-
tion."3 2
26. E.g., a corporate distribution. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 317(a), 355.
27. See Hobbet, supra note 10, at 105 & n.10.
28. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
29. For authority citing Commissioner v. Court Holding Co. as a step-transaction doc-
trine case, see West Coast Marketing Corp., 46 T.C. 32, 41 (1966).
30. 338 U.S. 451 (1950), aff'g 83 F. Supp. 843 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
31. For an analysis of the Court Holding Co. and Cumberland Pub. Serv. Comm'n
cases, see B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS, 11.63 at 11-53 to 58 (abr. ed. 1971).
32. Id. at 11-58. Section 337 provides that a corporation will not recognize gain or loss
from sale or exchange of property within a 12-month period if the corporation adopts a plan
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Several recent cases deciding the tax consequences of charita-
ble contributions of close corporation stock by shareholders prior to
liquidation or redemption have relied on either the substance versus
form doctrine or the step transaction doctrine to justify the imposi-
tion of tax liability. In Jacobs v. United States,33 a case of first
impression dealing with a stock contribution followed by a liquida-
tion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding that the
taxpayer did not make an assignment of income when he donated
shares of a close corporation to a charity after the shareholders" had
adopted a plan for complete liquidation but before the actual liqui-
dation payments were made.35 Ignoring the fact that the taxpayer
controlled the corporation, the court reasoned that since a repudia-
tion of the dissolution proceedings theoretically was possible until
the actual payments were made, the taxpayer did not realize the
liquidation proceeds at the time of the gift." The procedure followed
by the taxpayer in Jacobs had obvious tax advantages: by donating
the gift of stock before the liquidation distribution the taxpayer
avoided the tax on the liquidation proceeds, and at the same time
received a charitable deduction. In the factually similar case of
Hudspeth v. Commissioner,3 however, the Eighth Circuit rejected
the Jacobs rationale, 31 concluding that the substance and economic
reality of the transaction were determinative.3 9 The Hudspeth court
held that, while abandonment of the liquidation proceedings techni-
cally was still possible at the time of the gift,"0 the essential factors
in determining tax liability were the taxpayer's intent and control,4
and by casting his vote for dissolution, the taxpayer had manifested
of complete liquidation within the 12-month period measured from the date of the adoption
of the plan. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337(a).
33. 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1968), aff'g mem. 280 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Ohio 1966).
34. The corporation was owned by the taxpayer, his relatives, and an employee.
35. On April 1, 1959, the corporation filed notice of its intent to liquidate with the
Internal Revenue Service; on April 29, 1959, it filed its statement of intent to dissolve with
the Secretary of State of Kentucky; on May 15, 1959, the Jacobs Family Foundation was
incorporated as a nonprofit, charitable organization; during the period between May 15 and
June 17, 1959, the taxpayer donated 90 shares to the foundation; and on September 24-28,
1959, the liquidation proceeds were paid.
36. 280 F. Supp. at 439.
37. 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'g 335 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
38. The taxpayer owned 81% of the stock in the corporation, and his 2 sons owned the
remainder. On April 10, 1964, the directors resolved to liquidate the corporation. On January
21, 1965, the taxpayer donated 67 shares of his stock to nine tax-exempt institutions. On
March 12 and 29, 1965, the corporation filed its Articles of Liquidation with the state.
39. 471 F.2d at 277.
40. Id. at 280. The court dismissed the final filing requirements as mere formalities.
41. Id. at 278.
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his intent to liquidate the corporation. Furthermore, the court rea-
soned that as majority stockholder the taxpayer was able to ensure
that the liquidation proceedings would continue;4 2 therefore, the
court concluded that it was reasonable to tax the taxpayer as the
recipient of the income.13 Recently, the Second Circuit adopted the
Hudspeth rationale in Kinsey v. Commissioner," a case in which the
taxpayer made a gift to a university of the controlling share 5 in a
corporation after a plan of liquidation had been adopted. Although
acknowledging that the liquidation proceeding could be repu-
diated,"9 the court, placing considerable emphasis on the transac-
tion's surrounding circumstances and the taxpayer's intent, con-
cluded that the adverse tax consequences of such a repudiation,"
the university's policy of liquidating donated shares, and the tax-
payer's obvious intention justified characterizing the substance of
the transaction as an assignment of income. In cases examining the
consequences of donations of close corporation stock prior to a
redemption, the courts also have emphasized the substance of the
transaction in determining whether the taxpayer received a con-
structive dividend from the redemption proceeds. In Behrend v.
United States,'8 the taxpayers had donated stock of their close cor-
poration to a family foundation prior to the subsequent redemption
of the stock by the corporation. The Fourth Circuit held that the
redemption proceeds did not constitute constructive dividends to
the taxpayer because the gifts were complete before the corporation
redeemed the stock. 9 Moreover, the court found that the taxpayer's
control was limited to his control of the corporation and did not
extend to the foundation. More importantly, the taxpayer did not
receive any benefits from the foundation after his gift.59 Recently,
42. "The liquidation had proceeded to such a point where we may infer that it was
patently never taxpayer's intention that his donees should exercise any ownership in a viable
corporation, but merely that they should participate in the proceeds of the liquidation." Id.
at 279.
43. Id. at 280.
44. 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'g 58 T.C. 259 (1972).
45. The taxpayer transferred 51% of the stock in the corporation.
46. Under Connecticut law a two-thirds majority of the shareholders is required to
adopt or to terminate a liquidation resolution previously adopted by the shareholders. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-376(c), -329(d). Therefore, it theoretically was possible for the univer-
sity and another shareholder to block the liquidation.
47. The practical effect would have been to jeopardize the rights of the shareholders to
treat previous distributions as capital gains rather than ordinary income.
48. 73-1 U.S. TAx CAs. 80,065 (4th Cir. 1972).




in Carrington v. Commissioner,5' the Fifth Circuit held that when a
close-corporation shareholder donated controlling stock to a church,
in accordance with a plan to redeem the shares in exchange for a
residence owned by the corporation to be used as a rectory, he did
not realize an actual or constructive dividend. In rejecting the Com-
missioner's argument that the step-transaction doctrine should be
applied to the transaction, the court found that the issue for deter-
mining the taxpayer's liability was whether the taxpayer had parted
with all dominion and control over his gift.52
The instant court, recognizing that substance must prevail over
form, observed that this maxim marked only the beginning of its
inquiry in determining whether taxpayer's pre-redemption gifts to
the institution should be given significance independent of the re-
demption.53 The court noted that the Commissioner did not contest
the lower court's finding that the gifts of stock were completed when
made, and consequently reasoned that it would be pure fiction to
treat the redemption proceeds as actually having been received by
the taxpayer. 4 Next the court addressed the Commissioner's argu-
ment that, notwithstanding the validity of the gifts, other circum-
stances, including the systematic nature of the gift-redemption
cycle, established that a mutually beneficial arrangement had been
reached by which the taxpayer was permitted to use the tax-exempt
status of the institution as a conduit for withdrawing funds from his
closely-held corporation without incurring any tax liability. First,
the court found that taxpayer's post-gift position as majority stock-
holder was itself insufficient to impose tax liability.5 Secondly, rely-
ing on Behrend and Carrington, the court held that the absence of
any obligation on the part of taxpayer's corporation to redeem the
stock when offered by the institution clearly refuted the Commis-
sioner's contention that taxpayer's donations were the first steps in
a prearranged series of transactions. Although it acknowledged that
tax considerations played a significant role in taxpayer's planning,
the court observed that taxpayer foresight is not a sufficient reason
to impose tax liability. Moreover, it reasoned that the Commis-
51. 476 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1973).
52. Id. at 708.
53. See Sheppard v. United States, 361 F.2d 972, 977 n.9 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
54. The court did acknowledge, however, that the Commissioner might have argued
that the portion of the redemption proceeds allocable to taxpayer's retained life interest was
taxable as a dividend. Nevertheless, since the Commissioner did not raise this argument in
the lower court, it found it would be inappropriate to consider the significance of the life
interest in its discussion of the gifts. 490 F.2d at 246 n.9.
55. Accord, National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
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sioner's application of the step-transaction doctrine would substi-
tute two fictional transactions-a redemption from taxpayer by the
corporation followed by taxpayer's gift to the institution-for two
actual transactions-a gift by taxpayer to the institution followed
by the corporation's redemption from the institution. The court
concluded that the doctrine was not applicable, and consequently
held that the redemption proceeds were not constructive dividends
to taxpayer. The dissent " argued that the closely held nature of the
corporation, the regularity with which the redemptions occurred,57
and the retention of a life income interest 8 in the gift with
substantial control over the reinvestment of the redemption pro-
ceeds were factors that justified application of the step transaction
doctrine to impose tax liability; these factors combined to allow
taxpayer a bail out of earnings and profits from his nondividend
paying corporation. In concluding that the Commissioner's assess-
ments should have been upheld, the dissent contended that both
Behrend and Carrington were distinguishable because in those cases
the taxpayer did not retain a life income interest nor was there a
pattern of redemption as existed in the present case.
The significance of the instant decision lies in its effect on tax
planning for majority stockholders whose assets consist primarily of
close-corporation stock. Ordinarily a close-corporation shareholder
interested in making a charitable contribution has the corporation
redeem a portion of his stock and then he transfers the pro-
ceeds-reduced by any tax paid on the redemption-to the char-
ity." Under the procedure followed by taxpayer in the instant deci-
sion, however, the shareholder gains important tax advantages; the
redemption is tax-free, he enjoys the benefits of financial diversifi-
cation and a dependable source of income while retaining control
over his nondividend-paying close corporation, and receives a chari-
table deduction for the remainder interest. 0 In addition, given the
56. 490 F.2d 241, 248 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
57. The dissent maintained that this sure expectation of redemption made the absence
of a written agreement unimportant. Id. at 249.
58. The dissent noted that the educational institution's reinvestments of the redemp-
tion proceeds gave taxpayer a life interest in an entirely different sort of security than he had
as owner of his close corporation's shares, thus accomplishing a financially desirable diversifi-
cation and creating a dependable interest and dividend flow. Id.
59. See Planning for Charitable Donations, UNrrED STATES TRusT (Monthly Rptr. Nov.
1973).
60. The instant decision was decided under law in effect prior to the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 and therefore to qualify a gift of a remainder interest in property for the charitable
deduction today taxpayer would have to make his donation in the form of an annuity trust,
a unitrust, or a pooled income fund. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170(f)(2), (3), 642(c),
664; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-6, -7, 1.642(c), 1.664-2, -3 (1969).
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decline in federal grants and corporate contributions to charitable
and educational institutions,6' the instant decision offers these insti-
tutions an attractive device to solicit contributions from individual
stockholders of close-corporations. The extent to which the holdings
provides a safe harbor is questionable, however, because of its incon-
sistency with the liquidation case, Kinsey, decided by the same
court. In Kinsey, the court implicitly applied the step-transaction
doctrine refusing to give any weight to the technical possibility that
the liquidation plan could have been repudiated after the gift of
stock was made. The Kinsey court focused on the economic reality
of the transaction and found that the possibility of repudiation was
vitiated by the potential adverse tax consequences to the sharehold-
ers, by the university's policy of systematically liquidating donated
stock and by the taxpayer's intent. 2 Yet in the instant case the same
court ignored the economically inescapable fact that sound fiscal
policy dictated an offer of redemption of close corporation stock by
the institution's treasurer and a reinvestment of the proceeds in
income-producing securities of a less risky nature.13 It is possible to
justify the inconsistency between Kinsey and the instant decision
on the ground that the donation of stock in the former occurred after
the adoption of a liquidation plan thereby establishing a presump-
tion that the donor intended to assign his income and not to donate
an interest in a going corporation, whereas in the instant decision
the taxpayer transferred the stock before a formal redemption plan
was adopted. If the distinction between the two cases is in fact based
upon the presence or absence of an express plan at the time of the
gift, the two cases illustrate a trap for the unwary taxpayer. A tax-
payer who contributes close-corporation stock to a charity after a
plan of liquidation (redemption) has been adopted will find himself
liable for an assignment of income. The well-advised taxpayer, how-
ever, can avoid tax liability by simply postponing his corporation's
adoption of the liquidation (redemption) plan until after he has
donated the stock to charity. There is a parallel between this trap
and the situation that existed after the Court Holding Co. and
Cumberland decisions. Just as Congress responded to the Court
Holding Co.-Cumberland trap by enacting section 337, perhaps
Congress should legislate in response to the trap created by Kinsey
61. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1973, at 73 col. 1.
62. See text of note 47 supra.
63. In addition, "[t]he stock was non-dividend-paying stock so that unless it was
redeemed by the corporation after the transfer to the charity, the reserved right to income
would [also] be meaningless." A. J. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1622 (Supp. 1973).
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and the instant decision. It would appear that there are two possible
approaches such legislation could take. On the one hand, Congress
could enact a statute which would provide for constructive dividend
treatment for gifts of close-corporation stock if the stock is subse-
quently redeemed by the corporation pursuant to a pre-gift plan
unless, by such a gift, the donor divests himself of control of his
corporation. While this approach would be consistent with present
dividend taxation policy and would reconcile Kinsey and the instant
decision, nevertheless, by such an approach, Congress would be in
effect "legislating the trap" by emphasizing the timing of the adop-
tion of an express plan. On the other hand, Congress could enact a
statute similar to section 337 which would permit the close-
corporation shareholder to make a charitable donation of stock
without regard to the timing of the adoption of an express plan. This
approach would reflect a desire by Congress to encourage charitable
gifts and would eliminate the present discrimination against close-
corporation shareholders which exists in the charitable contribution
area. As indicated above, 4 a gift of nondividend-paying close-
corporation stock is valueless to an educational institution or char-
ity unless the stock can be redeemed by the corporation or ex-
changed for liquidation assets-an event that, under Kinsey, may
produce tax liability to the donor. A gift of public-issue corporation
stock, however, provides the institution with a readily marketable,
income-producing asset, which can be held by the donee with no
necessity of redemption or liquidation.
In addition to this inconsistency with Kinsey, the instant deci-
sion's emphasis on correctly timing the adoption of an express plan
illustrates another shortcoming; by holding that the redemption
proceeds were not constructive dividends to the taxpayer the deci-
sion limits the scope of the step-transaction doctrine, whose appli-
cation is called for when the substance of a transaction reveals the
existence of a plan or obligation that is not readily apparent from
the transaction's form. The instant decision is also distinguishable
from the close-corporation stock-redemption cases upon which the
majority heavily relied. In the Fourth Circuit's Behrend holding a
crucial factor was that the taxpayer did not receive any post-gift
benefits from the foundation. 5 The taxpayer in the instant case,
however, received quarterly dividend payments from the institu-
tion's investment account. In contrast to the taxpayer in Carring-
ton, the instant taxpayer did retain dominion and control over his
64. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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gift through his designation of the investment advisor to the uni-
versity's account." It is debatable whether the taxpayer's receipt
of benefits in the form of quarterly dividend payments and his re-
tention of some control over his gift justify taxing him as the reci-
pient of the full value of the redemption proceeds. As the majority
pointed out, 7 in future cases a more successful argument for the
Commissioner might be that the taxpayer should be taxed as a
constructive recipient of the redemption proceeds to the extent of
the value of his retained life interest. Such an argument would be
consistent with tax policy by preventing the tax-free bail-out of
earnings and profits from a nondividend-paying close-corporation
and it would be consistent with Behrend and Carrington by taxing
the donor to the extent of his retained control over his gift and his
receipt of benefits from the donee.
66. Alumnus' Charitable-Giving Program Passes the Test, 9 CCH 1974 STAND. FED.
TAX. REP., Rewrite Bulletins (74-9 at 75, 456) 8264 (1974).
67. See note 54 supra.
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